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Abstract. This project involves the examination of Kurdish nationalism in regard to 
the formation, transmission, and materialization of political memory. Focusing on 
developments of the 20th and 21st century, this analysis contextualizes the mobilization of 
Kurdish political consciousness within the modern forces of globalization, digital 
technology, mass media, and international governance. Substantial attention is paid to the 
role of radio, TV, and the Internet in the processes of national imagining and political 
discourse. NGOs and superstate institutions like the UN are also examined, as they play a 
fundamental role in integrating human rights language and sub-national movements like 
the Kurds. Additionally, the ways in which these developments are manifested through 
public spaces of memory provide insight into the parameters and aspirations undergirding 
Kurdish national identity. This project seeks to claim that traditional definitions and 
typologies of nationalism are insufficient, and that the nation, seen as a community of 
memory, provides better access points to understand how nations are created in the 
modern age.
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Chapter 1 
Introduction: Political Memory and the Nation 
On April 15th, 2017 I meandered through the streets of Istanbul on the eve of what 
would come to be a painful memory for millions of Kurdish people living in Turkey. Up 
above, the stolid eyes of authoritarian Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan peered 
over the crowded thoroughfares along with the words, “Evet söz de Karar da Milletin.” 
(Yes. The Verdict Is the Nation) Much less prominent, and limited to just a few streets 
near Taksim Square—where in 2013 Turkish citizens staged the largest anti-government 
protest in a generation—smaller banners, some with the face of a child, hung between the 
buildings and read a single word: Hayir (No). The city had been decorated over the 
course of the preceding weeks in posters and banners in anticipation for a national 
referendum that would consolidate vast power in the hands of one man, now both head-
of-state and leader of the parliamentary majority party, the AKP.  
	
Figure 1: (Left) AKP poster of Pro-Erdogan slogan. (Right) Banners hung by opposition party CHP. 
Along with President Erdogan’s plan to elevate the Turkish Republic on the world 
stage is a drive to remake Turkish culture. This past December, Ankara announced it 
would replace the main opera house in Istanbul, created in memory of secularist Turkish 
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founding father Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, with a new structure. The previous building was 
called the Atatürk Cultural Center (AKM) and symbolized the great leap towards 
modernization undertaken by Kemal in the infancy of a political entity carved out of the 
defunct Ottoman Empire. Though the AKM remained a cultural staple of the Turkish 
Republic for nearly 50 years, the construction of a new opera house reflects state-directed 
cultural battles over the secularization project implemented at the Republic’s founding.  
For many, this is a shrewd move by Erdogan to reorient Turkish culture away 
from the “secular-elite” and encourage conservative Islamic values within his 
increasingly authoritarian presidential system of “democracy.” In response to the few 
remaining critics of the regime that are not either in jail,1 missing, or in exile, Erdogan 
stated, “the mentality opposed to building the AKM anew is the same that tries to 
obstruct Turkey’s fight against terrorist organizations.”2 Undoubtedly, he is referring to 
the PKK, a Kurdish militant political party that waged war against the Turkish state in the 
1980s and 90s and has intermittently been involved in violent confrontations ever since. 
The 2015 scuttling of peace negotiations between the PKK and Erdogan, coupled with 
the continued state of emergency declared after a failed July 2016 coup,3 has resulted in 
the dismissal and arrest of many Kurdish parliamentary deputies and mayors, particularly 
those that represent the heavily Kurdish populated areas in eastern Anatolia.4 As the 
																																																								
1 The Committee to Protect Journalists now counts that Turkey handily outpaces China in the detention of 
journalists. In 2017 alone, seventy-three journalists were detained which account for over a quarter of all 
journalists arrested worldwide. 
https://cpj.org/data/imprisoned/2017/?status=Imprisoned&end_year=2017&group_by=location 
2 https://www.theartnewspaper.com/news/erdogan-replaces-ataturk-s-cultural-legacy-with-his-own 
3 https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/09/29/to-no-ones-surprise-erdogan-extends-
turkeys-state-of-emergency-after-failed-coup/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.2c5dca3d0d79 
4 Amberin Zaman, “Fury Erupts after Mayors Detained in Turkey’s Kurdish Southeast,” Al-Monitor, 
October 26, 2016 (www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals /2016/10/turkey-arrest-mayors-diyarbakir-
kurdish.html); and “Turkish Courts Arrests Diyarbakır Co-Mayors,” Hürriyet Daily News, October 31, 
2016.	
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battle between Turkey’s secular and religious elements rage on, Erdogan sees the state as 
an indispensible tool in fighting a national culture war, of which the Kurds are a major 
combatant. The conflation of political dissent with separatism, treason, and terrorism is a 
prominent feature of Turkish state discourse and effectively illegalizes Kurdish identity. 
The current political crisis will not abruptly end with the cessation of violence (which I 
do not believe is anywhere in sight), but will endure through the crises and confrontations 
of memory between various groups within and outside the Turkish Republic. As the 
Kurdish people are no stranger to oppression, Erdogan’s crack down is just another 
iteration of violence that animates the burgeoning collective memory of Kurds spread 
over four different states—each with their own troubled history.  
Benedict Anderson claimed in 1983 “’the end of the era of nationalism’, so long 
prophesized, is not remotely in sight.”5 The events of the last 30 years would serve to 
corroborate, but he additionally identified a major challenge for our time, one that has 
persisted and will have profound implications reaching every corner of the globe—that of 
the political struggles between the nation-state and sub-nationalities.6 Communities 
that—whether in established democracies, transitional regimes, or authoritarian states—
“dream of shedding this sub-ness one day.”7 They may demand cultural freedom, 
political autonomy or independence, international protection or recognition, or economic 
redress for systematic exclusion, whether political or economic or social or cultural. The 
memory of the nation building process in any country is fraught with controversial 
heroes, dubious or wholly fabricated historical narratives, and unsavory policies. While 
																																																								
5 Anderson, Imagined Communities, 1991, p. 3 
6 The term sub-nationality can denote a distinctly ethnic, linguistic, or cultural minority within the borders 
of an internationally recognized nation state. 
7 Anderson, Imagined Communities, 1991, p. 3 
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some believe these to be justifiable— often on the grounds of saving the nation—sub-
national political movements are inextricably tied and arguably born from resentment 
harbored from such questionable events. It is the manner in which these resentments are 
expressed, through the formation of sub (versive) historical narratives, that aspiring 
nations stylize their imagined community.  
The creation of sub-national movements is uniquely tied to the living presence of 
the dead—to the memory of struggle, atrocity, and heroes whose actions ripple through 
time, through history, refusing to “remain in the past, insisting on [their] presence.”8 
Frictions between the nation-state and sub-nationalities are, in the words of Elizabeth 
Jelin, “issues that entail coming to terms with a past that goes back several decades…. 
Those directly affected by repression bear the suffering and pain, which they translate 
into political action.”9 
Here, German provides better access to conceptualizing the doggedness of a 
painful past. What we are concerned with can be enclosed in two words: 
Vergangenheitsbewältigung and Geschichtaufarbeit. The gist of these terms is ‘coming to 
terms with the past,’ but alternate translations are ‘overcoming, facing, confronting, 
treating, and working over’ the past. Transitional or even established democracies with 
difficult pasts, as in the case of Germany and the United States, are plagued by the 
problem of integrating memories of major injustices sanctioned under state auspices into 
historical narratives. The difficulty in addressing these failures includes, “whether to treat 
the past at all, in any of the diverse available ways, or simply to try to forget and look to 
																																																								
8 Jelin, State Repression and the Labors of Memory, 2003, p. xiv 
9 Ibid, p. xv 
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the future; when to address it, if it is to be addressed; who should do it; and last but not 
least, how?”10  
For authoritarian regimes, however, the rigidity of national history resists and 
even criminalizes revisions of state-sponsored narratives. As George Orwell astutely 
observed, “who controls the past, controls the future…who controls the present, controls 
the past.”11 Orwell was writing about the totalitarian regimes of the 20th century, yet we 
still find ourselves facing, both in liberal democracies and illiberal regimes parading as 
democracies, a return to the past as a means of social control.12 The exertion of state 
power over memory can manifest in the creation of national monuments, commemorative 
holidays, the commissioning of historical studies, and the infiltration of mass media by 
the state. As authoritarian regimes prop up historical narratives for the purpose of 
‘national unity’ or ‘national pride,’ they necessarily disavow any memories that challenge 
that construction. When repressed memories come from ethnically, linguistically, or 
culturally homogenous groups, a “segregated memory contributes to a segregated 
polity.”13 This mnemonic segregation is not only a segregation of who gets to say what 
happened, to whom, and in what way; it carries implications in the present by preventing 
peoples from anchoring their own identities in their experiences. It poses a serious threat 
to individual liberty when a nation-state meddles in the propagation and dissemination of 
an official historical experience.  
																																																								
10 Ash, Trials, Purges, and History Lessons: treating a difficult past in post-communist Europe, 2002, p. 
266 
11 George Orwell 1984 
12 In Foreign Affairs magazine’s first volume of 2018, they chose to address “The Undead Past: How 
Nations Confront the Evils of History.” Particularly startling is the blatant construction of bogus historical 
narratives and reorientation towards the past by backsliding democracies—particularly Russia, Turkey, 
Hungary, and Poland. 
13 Brendese, The Power of Memory in Democratic Politics, 2014, p. 4 
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“The heart of any individual or group identity is linked to a sense of 
permanence,”14 and this link is always a connection to the past. Identity is partly, if not 
predominantly, generated and preserved through the recording of memories. Yet in the 
case of illiberal regimes, state functionaries can maintain legitimacy through the elevation 
of specific memories that justify privilege and inequality, or wholly denounce memories 
contradictory to the states needs or claims. Instances such as these often arise when the 
state employs force on its own citizenry while publically claiming innocence. As Jelin 
notes, “Periods of international crisis or external threats are usually preceded, 
accompanied, or succeeded by crises in the sense of collective identity and in 
memories.”15  
In the context of sub-national movements, the recording and dissemination of 
memories—often those of violence and oppression at the hands of the state and the 
tyrants who wield them—is an inherently subversive political act. This act is what P.J. 
Brendese calls a radical act of remembrance.16 The commitment to preserve, through 
memory, stories of resistance and struggle can inspire present generations to resist 
oppression and strive for the impossible. These memories are often recollections of the 
heroic dead and their noble actions, or moments of endurance experienced by a specific 
group of people. Brendese sees radical remembrance as, “a way to cultivate solidarity 
with democrats gone and those not yet born.”17 Nationalist projects, particularly ones 
born of political struggle against totalitarian nation-states, are concerned with achieving 
																																																								
14 Jelin, State Repression and the Labors of Memory, 2003, p. 14 
15 Ibid, p. 15 
16 Brendese, The Power of Memory in Democratic Politics, 2014, p. 15 
17 Ibid, p. 132 
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continuity and justice between the honorable dead and the hopeful living. As Avishai 
Margalit wrote: 
“I believe that… a community of memory is a community not only based on thick 
relations18 to the living but also on thick relations to the dead… It is a community 
that is concerned with the issue of survival through memory.”19 
 
Thus for aspiring nations, the issue of remembrance, of political memory, is a 
central element of maintaining collective identity and inspiring sacrifice. Anderson 
observes: “Ultimately, it is fraternity that makes it possible… for so many millions of 
people, not so much to kill, as willingly to die for such… imaginings (nations).”20 As 
modern history has brought about an anthropological revolution uncovering “peoples 
without a history”, it becomes clear that these communities primarily exist through 
private memories of the dead—stories of people not yet incorporated into the official 
canons of history. How these stories are recorded, exported, and transmitted are of 
significant importance to the formation of national identities, particularly sub-nations 
within or across internationally recognized nation states. 
The Kurds represent such a community whose struggle over the last century has 
precipitated a substantial memory explosion. As the Kurds are fragmented across four 
nation-states in the Middle East, their experience with state violence and repression is 
primarily preserved through the formation of counter memory narratives, which are 
unique to each political space they inhabit. Yet underlying these narratives are consistent 
themes of struggle, endurance, and hope. Studying Kurdish memory in its entirety would 
entail looking back hundreds of years, but for the purposes of this project I will limit my 																																																								
18 Margalit marks a difference between thick and thin—ethical and moral—relations between humans. The 
former caries the connotation of a specific relation to oneself— such as family, community, and nation— 
while thin encompasses relations to groups like the poor, the sick, or some other general category. 
19 Margalit, The Ethics of Memory, 2004, p. 69 
20 Anderson, Imagined Communities, 1991, p. 7 
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inquiry to the landscape of memory politics and its effect on Kurdish political discourse 
in contemporary life—which I roughly define as the period spanning from the 1950s to 
the present. The formation and expression of Kurdish memory differs considerably 
among age cohorts; institutional and state boundaries; and many other local religious, 
tribal, and cultural identities that exist below the prevailing Kurdayeti.21 As a result, an 
inquiry into Kurdish memory generally would be far too lengthy and outside the 
parameters of this project. Rather, I will focus on how modernity has structurally changed 
the process of national imagining with respect to collective memory. 
Chapter two provides the theoretical context of memory politics, and I argue that 
the modern nation is primarily a community of memory whose function is to assert 
sovereignty. Subsequently, comparisons between those nations whose memories are 
formulated from the top-down and bottom-up provide a jumping off point to investigate 
the effects of globalization and technology on the formation of collective memory. 
Chapter three outlines a brief historical background of the Kurds in order to frame 
the following analysis. In the fourth chapter, I will focus primarily on the evolution of 
Kurdish memory discourse in Turkey, Iraq, and Iran in relationship to three topics: (1) 
globalized technologies such as TV, radio, the Internet, and transportation; (2) 
international discourse concerning human rights, economic development, and political 
liberalization, as well as the institutions and actors involved; (3) and how these themes 
coalesce in public spaces. The extent to which these narratives can be leveraged for 
democracy and freedom remains to be seen, but perhaps, through memory, the Kurds can 
come to terms with the past and construct a nation oriented towards a better future.																																																								
21 Kurdayeti denotes the singular concept of ‘Kurdish national identity’, which is by no means reflective of 
subjective consensus. It varies between individuals and groups and across time, and the lens of memory 
provides a jumping off point for understanding and tracing various expressions. 
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Chapter 2 
The Nation as a Community of Memory 
 
Defining the Nation 
 Numerous studies have shown that the nation can be manifested in many different 
forms and contexts making a singular definition difficult to pin down. This dilemma has 
plagued social scientists as early as the 1930s, and in the time since, “all attempts to 
develop terminological consensus around nation [have] resulted in grand failure.”1 
Among these difficulties are: the (1) objective modernity of the nation as a political 
organization in contrast to the subjective antiquity of the nation espoused by leading 
nationalists; and (2) the formal universality of the nation as a fundamental element of 
personal identity while each nation remains distinct and particular. Rather than remain 
entangled in these anomalies, social scientists have shifted focus towards categorizing 
different nationalisms within the sociopolitical and economic contexts of a particular time 
and region. In order to refine a definition of the nation, I begin with the following 
typology common in scholarship, and then return to the two aforementioned peculiarities.  
 The most common categorical distinction is made between civic and ethnic 
nations. The former, often described as rational and voluntaristic, are ostensibly rooted in 
a shared set of principles and institutions where membership is based on choice. The 
latter, ethnic nations, are based on shared history and common ancestry, which often 
assert legitimacy based on the ‘subjective antiquity’ animating the first dilemma. These 
terms often carry normative connotation: to be civic is to be liberal democratic and good; 
																																																								
1 Croucher, Perpetual Imagining: Nationhood in a Global Era, 2003, p. 2 
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to be ethnic is to be illiberal and bad. This binary, however, is insufficient. Shared 
heritage and common culture are relevant to all national groups, albeit in varying degrees. 
While the justifications of national belonging can change over time and in response to 
different political contexts, citizens of the same nation can have radically different 
criterion for national membership. As Anthony Smith argues in Nationalism and 
Modernism, “very few national states possess only one form of nationalism.”2 This lack 
of standardization in national identity makes binary distinctions, as well as universal 
definitions, rather unhelpful and often misleading. 
 The United States is cited as the preeminent example of a civic nation, yet as 
Bernand Yack remarks, the characterization of such nations as rational and voluntaristic 
is “a mixture of self-congratulations and wishful thinking.”3 At closer inspection, even 
civic nations are underpinned by the cultural expectations of the majority ethnic or 
linguistic group. Social factors such as race, religion, and language are inseparable to the 
formation of national belonging, and just as ethnic nations may be exclusionary, civic 
nations may require radical assimilation to national culture and even employ the same 
exclusionary policies expected of ethnically defined nation-states. Studies of immigration 
policy in the United States provide numerous examples in which ethnicity and language 
have been integral to nationalism and American citizenship. Though I will not delve 
further into the topic, scholars such as Benjamin Schwarz and Phillip Gleason have cast 
doubt on the exclusively civic foundations of American citizenship.4 
																																																								
2 Quoted from Croucher, Perpetual Imagining, 2003, pp. 5 See also Smith, Nationalism and Modernism, 
1998, p. 212 
3 Ibid, p. 5 
4 Benjamin Schwarz’s The Diversity Myth: America’s Leading Export was published in The Atlantic in 
May 1995 and focuses on the process of assimilation into American life, whereby minority ethnic groups 
are “cleansed” of their previous ethnic identity. Additionally, Phillip Gleason’s Speaking of Diversity 
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 Returning to Anthony Smith’s claim reveals another conceptual difficulty in 
defining the nation: the misguided confounding of the nation and the state. The term 
nation-state is often used as the unit of analysis when creating typologies of nationalism, 
yet it disregards many modern political identities that exist largely separate from 
territorially defined states. While states can be quantitatively defined by geographical 
location and identifiable institutions, national belonging emanates from evolving 
subjective sociological criteria. In contrast to the relatively stable borders of states, 
national identity is a phenomenon with porous boundaries. Nations that have no state of 
their own and are spread out across the borders of multiple states further complicate 
analysis of nationalism. Moreover, many states contain multiple nations who nonetheless 
participate in the same state electoral and political institutions. Traditional classifications 
and universal definitions are increasingly untenable within the modern manifestations of 
national belonging, and new lenses are needed to conceptualize this political identity. 
Each national styling is highly dependent on the cultural roots of a community 
that define the expressions of, or justifications for “horizontal comradeship.”5 For 
Benedict Anderson, the nation finds its cultural roots in the integration of state structures 
and vernacular languages coalesced by the proliferation of print capitalism. Print 
vernaculars allowed exchange and interaction between persons who would come to see 
all others in their language-field as a part of the national community. Poems, plays, and 
novels written in a particular linguistic community provided the cultural connections 
between members of a distinct language group. Anderson writes, “[the nation] is 
imagined because even the members of the smallest nations will never know most of their 																																																								
provides an interesting inspection of the ‘Melting Pot’ symbolism in American discourse and its various 
meanings in relation to ethno/linguistic national belonging in American political life. 
5 Anderson, Imagined Communities, 1991, p. 7 
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fellow-members.” This imagining is inherently exclusionary, as no nation is constructed 
conterminously with all mankind, and sovereign, as it implies political self-
determination. The distillation of nationalism, in Anderson’s view, is inherently tied to 
the cultural roots of modernity. He posits the nation as a necessary outgrowth of 
industrialization, increased literacy, urbanization, and the consolidation of the modern 
bureaucratic state. In this respect, the nation is more an instrument for achieving 
economic or political development rather than an organic community. As such, the nation 
can be better defined as “a community with a distinctive consciousness and a shared 
sense of mission.”6  
For any community, membership is founded upon knowledge of the group’s 
history, language, major struggles, romanticized heroes, and customs. To become a 
distinct cultural entity—an imagined community—groups must define themselves in 
relation to others by creating a shared history or collective memory. The glue that binds 
individuals together within a nation is a wellspring of shared experiences and stories—
transmitted across generations—that justify the consciousness of the particular group and 
orient political, economic, or social goals. Nationalist projects, in order to form ties 
between persons who will likely never meet or know one another personally, are 
necessarily mnemonic projects. Communities of memory can exist within and across state 
borders, but what distinguishes national communities of memory from other religious or 
institutional communities is the demand of political self-determination or group 
sovereignty.7  
																																																								
6 Croucher, Perpetual Imagining: Nationhood in a Global Era, 2003, p. 5 
7 Communities of memory can exist on both micro and macro level. Institutions such as local churches, 
police and fire departments, and schools can constitute their own micro communities of memory.  
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Identities, in this light, are preserved through the creation of group memories, 
which define national belonging and express the specifics of a shared mission. Teresa de 
Leuretis defines identity as, “an active construction and a discursively mediated political 
interpretation of one’s history.”8 This interpretation is precisely what undergirds 
Anderson’s imagined communities, and as a result, the nation should be defined as a 
particular community of memory whose mission is to assert some level of sovereignty. 
By adding the memory lens to the definition of the nation, one can better analyze the raw 
materials with which nations are constructed. As Anderson’s focus in Imagined 
Communities is the cultural forces that precipitated nationalism, this thesis aims to 
investigate the memory work inherent to such imaginings.  
When talking about the study of political or cultural memory, social scientists are 
generally referring to shared communal practices and beliefs as distinguished from 
individual recollection. Though cultural memory is built upon the recollection individual 
experiences, they are mediated by various institutions, social practices, and groups. 
Collective memory thus serves as a metaphor for the process by which groups organize 
many different individual recollections into a communal narrative of historical events. 
Studies of political memory may start with the individual, but the process and 
implications of the collectivization of memory is paramount.  
Collective memory is also distinct from common memory, or, the aggregate 
memories of individuals who experienced some specific episode. When people ask the 
question, “Where were you on 9/11?” they are inquiring about individual recollection 
within a temporally constrained experience —by whether you were actually there to 
																																																								
8 Assmann, Cultural Memory and Western Civilization, 2013, p. 53 
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witness the event. Collective or cultural memory on the other hand, is not so constrained 
by time, and in fact it specializes is traversing generational barriers.  
Cultural memory is a process reliant on communication and transmission, 
meaning that those who did not directly experience an event can be “plugged in… 
through channels of description.”9 Rather than restricted to those who have first-hand 
memories, it is passed on as cultural knowledge essential to formulating group identity. It 
has implications for the ways we act, how we ascribe meaning to events, and prompts us 
to feel. Though there are many names for it,10 they all denote the mechanism by which 
bodies of people come to see themselves as a single cultural, political, or unique 
community. “Memory…incorporates knowledge, beliefs, behavior patters, feelings, and 
emotions conveyed and received in social interaction, in processes of socialization, and in 
the cultural practices of a group.” It is expressed and performed in traditions, holidays, 
gestures, language, and nearly everything that one counts as an element of identity, and is 
best understood using the following two-pronged classification. 
Inhabited or functional memory, serves to connect the past, present, and future 
through value-laden knowledge. Functional memory places value on events meaning that 
it creates narratives of group identity—including articulation of origin stories, 
interpretations of historical events, and goals for the future. It acts as a guiding force for 
personal behavior and political action by incorporating the individual into the narrative 
that it creates. Functional memories are inhabited by those that remember. In contrast, 
uninhabited memory or storage memory disconnects the present and past through 
information collected under the suspension of behavioral norms and values. It is 																																																								
9 Margalit, The Ethics of Memory, 2004, p. 52 
10 Similar terms include: shared memory, national history, political memory, cultural memory, collective 
memory, and collective history.  
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dissociated from any carrier, meaning that it does not bestow identity or transmit moral 
knowledge; it collects all information on the basis of equality. Primarily, it is for the 
purposes of storage. “It contains what is unusable, obsolete, or dated; it has no vital ties 
to the present and no bearing on the future.”11 These two memory types correspond to 
collective memory and historical data respectively. 
Storage memory, once collected, “is the amorphous mass of unused and 
unincorporated memories that surround functional memory like a halo.”12 These 
uninhabited pieces of information are relics of past civilizations, the writings and 
documents of persons dead and regimes overtaken, among other historical data. They 
exist in physical and digital archives waiting to be discovered and brought to light. 
Functional memories on the other hand carry with them essential lessons from the past, 
and provide continuity to normative values. They can come from contemporary events or 
stories unearthed in archives and archeological sites—essentially from banks of storage 
memories. This includes stories of leaders, heroes, martyrs, struggles, and successes, 
often manifested in publically accessible ways including literature, monuments, and 
media. Aleida Assman identifies the two central functions of this type of memory 
knowledge: “those of affect and of identity, that is, as a motivation force and formative 
self-image.”13  
The modern nation is perhaps the foremost legitimate source of functional 
memories in contemporary life, and when we are talking about national collective 
memory, we are talking about the memories that nations choose to inhabit in order to 
construct identity and formulate collective interest. Consequentially, a nation is a 																																																								
11 Assman Cultural Memory and Western Civilization, 2013, p. 127 
12 Ibid, p. 125 
13 Assman, Cultural Memory and Western Civilization, 2013, p. 120 
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community of functional memory that asserts political sovereignty. This memory 
definition of the nation solves the anomalies mentioned earlier. Regarding the first, a 
national community of memory can be formed in modernity, but assimilate cultural 
knowledge from antiquity into its own narrative. Though its consciousness is born in 
modernity, its memories may reach further back in time.14 On the second, all national 
memories are unique and differentiable from every other, but all nations exist for the 
purpose of claiming sovereignty. What differentiates nations, along this memory 
definition, is the extent to which narratives are created and perpetuated by the state or 
public discourse. 
 
Top-Down v. Bottom-Up National Communities of Memory 
It is in the realm of memories, and the weaving of these into historical narratives, 
that the nation becomes a nation. Yet this process is not the same for every national 
community. Collective memories constantly evolve and update, involving the placement 
of emphasis on some memories over others for explicitly political reasons. “The outcome 
is not a chaotic disorder, because there is some structure shaped by cultural codes and 
some social organization—where some voices are stronger than others because they have 
greater access to resources and to public stages.”15 A common typology to the study of 
nationalism is the distinction between those formed from the top-down and from the 
bottom-up, and this classification is more useful in examining the nation as a community 
of memory than the civic/ethnic distinction. 
																																																								
14 Common examples of this nationalism are Indian, Chinese, and Greek, which often consider themselves 
the inheritors of historically important ancient civilizations. 
15 Jelin, p. 12 
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The nation relies on various conduits of memory in order to create its historical 
narratives. Margalit notes that because shared memory involves the transmission of 
experiences that many were not personally witnesses, communities of memory rely on a 
‘division of mnemonic labor,’16 where multiple different members of society—including 
family members, teachers, artists, journalists, and politicians—all work to perpetuate or 
create certain cultural knowledge. Transmission of shared memories additionally travels 
through institutions, both public and private. These can include schools, private 
associations, interest groups, political parties, religious organizations, and most 
importantly, mass media. Not only does a community of memory share cultural 
knowledge, but requires a “responsibility to see to it that memory is kept alive [and] may 
require some minimal measure of memory by each in the community.”17 I argue that the 
extent to which national memories are constructed by a diverse public or a select few 
corresponds to the bottom-up process and top-down process respectively, and 
additionally corresponds to a positive and negative normative value.  
Top-down communities of memory are often formed and perpetuated using state 
institutions and power to disseminate historical narratives. Karl Deutsch depicts this 
process of nation building as a result of modern state structures constructing political 
communities of their own by directing cultural knowledge. In this argument, the nation is 
portrayed as the “ideological alibi of the state”18 with the state existing prior to collective 
memory. Sheila Croucher writes, “States have long relied on nations as their raison d’être 
and in a period of threatened sovereignty tend to use and to fortify the nation as an 
																																																								
16 Margalit, 2004, p. 52 
17 Ibid, 2004, p. 58 
18 Croucher, Perpetual Imagining, 2003, p. 10 
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ideological alibi.”19 These alibis, particularly in authoritarian nations, present narratives 
that justify actions taken by the state, often with the military presented as the ‘savior’ of 
the nation. Elizabeth Jelin calls these state-sponsored master narratives ‘official 
memories.’ They are official in that they are disseminated for the purpose of reinforcing 
the legitimacy of the state and its interests.  
Anderson also conflates top-down national projects with what he calls “official 
nationalism.” Above all, “the one persistent feature of this style of nationalism was, and 
is, that it is official—i.e. something emanating from the state, and serving the interests of 
the state first and foremost.”20 Official nationalism, as defined by Anderson, necessitates 
a marriage between the state and a hegemonic identity. As the narratives are imposed and 
command adherence to values and customs, when the state creates memories to define 
and promote national culture group identity takes on exclusivity—often in the form of 
ethnicity, language, or religion. As Sheldin Wolin writes, “The danger is that the identity 
given to the collectivity by those who exercise power will reflect the needs of power 
rather than the political possibilities of a complex collectivity.”21 State-led cultural 
projects necessarily subjugate individual identity to the needs of political interest. In this 
top-down process, “states respond to encroachments upon their sovereignty…by 
clarifying the boundaries and significance of belonging to a nation.”22 These boundaries 
are solidified and reinforced by driving out “any unofficial remembrance that might 
present itself as a critically subversive functional memory.”23  
																																																								
19 Ibid, 2003, p. 14 
20 Anderson, 1991, p. 157 
21 Brendese, 2014, p. 49 
22 Ibid, 2003, p. 16 
23 Assmann, 2013 p. 128 
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In contrast, the bottom-up process of cultural memory formation occurs 
predominantly without the assistance of a state, and often in response to state-led nation 
building projects or political oppression/crises generally. These communities of memory 
claim their own nationhood as the most readily available and productive pathway towards 
creating a state of their own; achieving political independence or autonomy; or asserting 
cultural rights of expression. Where states exist prior to national communities of memory 
in top-down nationalist movements, the bottom-up process begins with a community of 
memory that expresses itself as a distinct nation, often for the purpose of creating a state. 
This expression is hardly uniform, and as Jelin notes, “multiple social and political actors 
come to the scene, and they craft narratives of the past that confront each other’s, and in 
so doing, they also convey their projects and political expectation of the future.”24 
Echoing Margalit’s division of mnemonic labor, the bottom-up process of national 
identity formation is a much more pluralistic and liberal process through which 
communities of memory exert sovereignty over their own identities.  
Bottom-up national memories often arise during political transitions when 
government archives are opened, individuals feel they can publicly express their 
memories, and political actors openly confront official narratives. In these settings, “both 
functional and storage memory interact in a dialectical relationship that is to be found in 
liberal literate cultures; and their future is to a large extent dependent on this ongoing 
intercourse.”25 National communities of memory created from the bottom-up are often 
preceded by political injustice or a traumatic past, and their memories are often 
																																																								
24 Jelin, 2003, p 29-30 
25 Assmann, 2013, p. 131 
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synonymous with calls for political change, greater equality, or establishment of 
democratic institutions.  
“The problem with official memory is that it depends on censorship and coerced 
rites of commemoration.”26 In contrast, what Margalit calls a proper community of 
memory is a group that creates its own parameters, values, and narratives. Often, the 
byproduct of oppression, violence, and forced cultural assimilation toward a group—
whether defined by ethnicity, sexuality, gender, or class—is the formation of proper 
communities of memory. These communities, in response to violence or marginalization, 
are people “who share a set of historical opportunities and limitations that provide 
them…with a ‘shared destiny.’”27 The use of memory for such national communities is to 
“recapture those few moments in the past which show the possibility of a better way of 
life than that which has dominated the earth thus far.”28 In this way, memories can 
emphasize the possibilities of new beginnings when the present feels, as if at every 
moment, it is the completion of historical inevitability. When injustice seems an 
irrevocable fact of existence, “the past suggests what can be, not what must be.”29  
In this light, repression and marginalization at the hands of the state can create 
communities of memory demarcated along racial lines, and as Margalit asks, “is it not 
injustice that hurts us into politics?”30 Enduring memories of trauma and political 
repression may animate shared memory as a narrative of collective struggle. Therefore, 
the definition of group boundaries along ethnic lines may be a political response to 
violence, disenfranchisement, or oppression. Associating ethnic nationalism with ‘bad’ 																																																								
26 Assmann, 2013, p. 127 
27 Jelin, 2003, p. 91 
28 Zinn, The Politics of History, 1971, p. 47 
29 Ibid, 1971, p. 282 
30 Margalit, 2004, p. 111 
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nationalism obscures legitimate demands for political change by marginalized ethnic 
groups. Instead, applying the distinction between nations built from the bottom-up or top-
down—which does not exist in a clear binary but rather a continuous scale—should yield 
a positive normative value to those communities of memory constructed outside the 
levers of state power. Margalit remarks, “The relation between a community of memory 
and a nation is such that a proper community of memory may help shape a nation, rather 
than the nation shaping the community of memory.31 In this sense, proper communities of 
memory exist prior to political organizations. Yet when the nation—or rather the nation-
state—creates a community of memory from the top-down, the nation is presented as 
existing prior to individual, becoming the sole proprietor of collective memory. 
Regardless of the civic or ethnic distinction of national belonging, state control over 
historical memory creates a crisis for individuality and the possibility of cultural 
innovation and political change. The traditional normative distinction between civic and 
ethno-linguistic nationalism is insufficient, as it does not account for the extent to which 
ethnic groups may invoke nation-ness to combat oppressive state-policies.   
Sub-national movements are directly engaged in this type of subversive memory. 
Assmann calls this ‘counter-memory,’ and it is a constitutive feature of political 
movements that aim to delegitimize power constellations controlling identity and culture 
through the use of force. “The motif underlying counter-memory, whose bearers are the 
conquered and the oppressed, is the delegitimation of power experienced as tyrannical. It 
is as political as the official memory, because in both instances it is linked with a claim to 
power.”32 These claims to power, however, do not emanate from the state, but rather boil 																																																								
31 Margalit, 2004, p. 101 
32 Assmann, 2013, p. 129 
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up from localized memories gaining collective meaning when connected with the 
common experiences of those who also endured violence.  
Counter narratives conceived in such a manner take on two functions in relation 
to official memory. Firstly, they aim to reconfigure public discourse around their “true” 
version of history, often debunking official narratives through the invocation of localized 
memories. Secondly, they carry with it demands of justice and political change in order to 
devolve narrative power from the state towards the individual. “In such moments, 
memory, truth, and justice blend into each other, because the meaning of the past that is 
being fought about is, in fact, part and parcel of the demand for justice in the present.”33 
In order to combat state power, the “potential power of resistance through the memory of 
the demos”34 directly subverts attempts to control political memory—and thereby the 
political actions invoked by those memories—by oppressive power structures. The 
process of democratization and the pursuit of greater individual rights and liberty must 
involve “both an ongoing tending to local memories… and a contestation of how certain 
pasts and futures are invoked and disavowed.”35 The interplay between greater political 
freedom, democracy, and sovereignty over memory undergird the development of sub-
national movements responding to state violence.  
The construction of counter-narratives and the elevation of repressed memories 
are symptoms of sub-national movements that demand a state of their own, autonomy, or 
cultural rights generally. Once these goals are realized, however, leaders of such 
revolutions run the risk of reverting to the same policies previously employed by the 
state. As Hans Kohn writes: 																																																								
33 Jelin, 2003, p. 29 
34 Brendese, 2014, p. 15 
35 Ibid, 2014, p. 12 
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“The former ‘oppressed’ ones become sometimes worse ‘oppressors,’ not only to 
their former ‘oppressors’ but of innocent third peoples… The recognition of the 
equality of all human beings, and their right to emancipation, promised by 
democratic revolution…is more often in deeds than words repudiated.”36  
 
Benedict Anderson saw this as the tendency for revolutionary leaderships to 
revert to the policies of old regimes, whether consciously or unconsciously, by the 
inheritance of state files, dossiers, archives, laws, financial records and other storage 
memories. He emphasizes that this occurs at a leadership level, because it is the leaders, 
not the people, “who inherit old switch boards and palaces.”37 Continuation of cultural 
freedom and persistent democratic opening is essential to enervating this impulse, and 
sub-national movements demanding autonomy, cultural rights, or independence are much 
more suited to employ memory in the service of freedom before they achieve their goals 
than they are after major political battles are won. For this reason, top-down nationalism 
poses a threat to individual liberty even when it comes from formerly oppressed 
peoples—or rather, former bottom-up nationalist movements. Where shared memory can 
be a rallying point for groups determined to achieve political freedom, it can also be a 
useful tool to perpetuate oppressive regimes or justify political acts of revenge. 
 
National Memory and Modern Technology 
The possibility of achieving justice for those victims of tyranny is uniquely tied to 
our conception of duty to the past, how we choose to remember the dead, what historical 
enmities we carry with us, the values that our memories communicate, and most 
importantly, what our memories compel us to do. Today, official national memory is 
threatened in a time of rapid exchange between nations and individuals. This new age of 																																																								
36 Kohn, 1968, p. 27 
37 Anderson, 1991, p. 161 
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globalization can be characterized as a period of “fragmentation and cultural hybridity 
amidst which the notions of cultural homogeneity forming the basis for nationhood have 
been thoroughly delegitimized.”38 The proliferation of sub-national movements is tied to 
inability of states to maintain legitimacy and simultaneously direct cultural memory. The 
advent of digital technology, mass media communication, and increased human mobility 
have structurally changed the way memories are transmitted and formed, and widened the 
areas of interaction between groups whose memories have remained distinct for 
centuries. The dynamics of this intercourse—including the use of television, computer 
technology, international organizations, and social media—have shaped the evolution 
national and sub-national movements alike, fundamentally altering the way communities 
of memory form and enter politics. The prospect of such unprecedented global discourse 
sets the stage for a plurality of different voices and narratives that will either justify the 
nation as a peaceful and prosperous political community, or foment instability and 
violence.  
The modern nation now exists in global community characterized by increased 
access to information, the proliferation of communication and transportation technology, 
and rapid cultural exchanges between places holding no contiguous land or historical 
interaction. Present in these exchanges are not only material goods, but also transmissions 
of human experience. As the entry price for ideological competition has been reduced 
through the advent of social media and other digital infrastructures, the ability of a person 
to export their perspective on a sequence of events creates a crisis for the traditional 
sources of collective memory.  
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“There is an evolving global digital infrastructure that will increasingly connect 
everyone to everyone, but not on equal terms nor at equal density… The most 
obvious, but also the most important change, is simply that governments and other 
official sources of information are no longer the key brokers of credibility (if they 
ever really were)… Just about everyone on the planet has, or will soon have, easy 
access to a cacophony of voices, a multiplicity of narratives, all starting from a 
more or less equal place when it comes to their ability to reach an audience.”39  
 
In this increasingly anarchic and competitive landscape, the struggle to write 
history includes the participation of actors who have traditionally been silenced—whether 
through economic, social, or political means—and democratizes the process through 
which personal memories are transmitted into national and global narratives. The 
proliferation of global digital infrastructure hastens structural changes to collective 
memory, and new avenues through which information is exchanged erode the monopoly 
that states maintain over communication and information. As a result, the formation of 
sub-national identity is more immediate, more easily exported, and more influenced by 
global discourse. Underlying this structural change is the increasing importance of 
images, media, and digital writing; the growing influence of the global human rights 
discourse through international media, NGOs, and other transnational actors; and finally, 
increased human mobility that emphasizes the importance of diaspora communities and 
further corrodes the relevance of state borders. 
Benedict Anderson’s print-language nationalisms are becoming superseded by the 
importance of global exchange through mass media and computer technology. Territorial 
boundaries underpinned and justified by the imagining of national print languages are 
anachronistic in an age where information can be instantaneously translated and 
transmitted to every corner of the globe. While print still maintains substantial 																																																								
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importance for unifying nations containing groups that speak distinct dialects, public 
discourse is increasingly bent towards new mediums that change the opportunities for 
imagining nations while increasing the interconnectedness of communities that would 
otherwise remain insulated. 
“Because globalization has been propelled by advances in technology, including 
Internet, satellites, fax machines, and cell phones as well as the increased sophistication 
of and spread of existing technologies such as television, it offers new and more effective 
opportunities for imagining nations.”40 This transition from traditional sources of written 
communication towards digital writing and images, movies, and television fundamentally 
alters the way cultural boundaries are overcome and marks a significant break with 
traditional mediums of political deliberation. As more and more voices are engaged in a 
global political discourse, images have come to replace words as the primary vehicle for 
engagement. The ability of individuals to capture and record information through pictures 
taken on cell phones and hand-held devices profoundly limits the ability of states to 
create official narratives. Using the example of photos taken in the Abu Ghraib prison 
during the American invasion of Iraq,41 Steven Webber and Bruce Jentleson show that 
information sharing through images and the Internet gives individuals an unprecedented 
power to combat and transform political memory. In their words, “how does one argue or 
change the mind of someone who believes in the meaning behind the Abu Ghraib 
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41 The United States Army and Central Intelligence Agency ran the Abu Ghraib prison, also known as the 
Baghdad Central Prison. Photos first obtained by CBS in 2004 chronicled numerous human rights 
violations of detainees, including torture, sexual abuse, and murder. These photos changed the “liberator” 
narrative of the US in its invasion of Iraq. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/abuse-at-abu-ghraib/ 
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photos?”42 This transition is a radical democratization of mnemonic power, not through 
political means, but thorough technological advancement.  
“The problem of cultural memory has become more acute under pressure of new 
media… Increasingly dense communication networks bring the most distant 
regions into direct contact, including radio and television that transmit their 
programs…thanks to satellites circling the globe. The storage capacity of new 
data-carriers and archives has shattered the confines of cultural memory.”43 
 
 These new mediums constitute “mechanisms that enhance our capacity for 
constructing, imagining, and maintaining nations.” 44  Particularly, the proliferation of 
television and satellite technology has played a substantial role in the formation of 
national identity, much in the same way that print previously held cultural dominance. 
Though states and trans-state entities like the European Union have found television an 
impressive tool in building national identities, “television could also offer opportunities 
to stateless nations or ethnic groups to subvert the control of a state… Through this and 
various other forms of globalizing technology—cell phones, email, and World Wide 
Web—individuals and groups within and across states can resist state-led efforts at nation 
building or pursue alternative forms of national community.”45 The potentiality of a more 
democratic memory is afforded new possibilities through the advent of such technologies, 
and through them, the state and identity are experiencing substantial dislocation.  
While groups are able to assert more sovereignty in the construction of their own 
identities, this technology invariably brings together local and global currents. Along 
with the shift from print towards digital and communication technology, national 
movements in the late 20th and 21st century have formed in close contact with 
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international actors and institutions. These nations are influenced by global discourse on 
human rights and liberal democracy, and as such, their communities of memory are 
shaped within the context of a cosmopolitan exchange. This bottom-up thrust of 
nationalism, particularly for nations suffering under authoritarian governments or 
currently in democratic transition, is intertwined with global actors committed toward 
liberalization.   
Elizabeth Jelin, in her study of the memory projects accompanying transitional 
democracy in Latin American, notes the importance of global actors and ideas in the 
formation of new, post-dictatorial narratives for national identity. “The human rights 
movement has been and continues to be a privileged actor in the political enterprise of 
memory… In all cases, the human rights movement is a heterogeneous actor that 
encompasses…diverse experiences and multiple horizons of expectations.”46 The 
political globalization of ideas and governance has brought with it a functional 
relationship between sub-national movements and claims for human rights and political 
liberalization. The transnational torchbearers of these political projects are actors and 
institutions that operate outside, around, and in opposition to states. They include 
Amnesty International, Oxfam, Doctors without Borders, Transparency International, the 
Unification Church and many others. These NGOs, along with supra-national 
organizations like the WTO, IMF, and UN all facilitate a global discussion centered on 
economic modernization and political liberalism. As Amy Sodarno notes, “there is in fact 
a cosmopolitan or transnational memory culture that transcends national borders and 
connects people and groups from widely divergent backgrounds… [It] transcends… other 
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hegemonic narrators of the past and works toward a…more peaceful democratic 
future.”47  
Collective memory of past violence and transitional justice lie at the center of 
contemporary international politics, and as technology turns continents into 
neighborhoods, “various forms of international governance systems have superseded 
states.”48 This shift in global governance has reoriented global politics in a way that 
sovereignty is more diffuse and involves more actors from different parts of the world. 
The global discourse on human rights, greater liberality equality, and transnational 
solidarity provides the atmosphere in which modern sub-national movements have 
formed.  
In addition to global information sharing and international institutions, the new 
possibilities of human mobility have challenged traditional notions of national belonging, 
and facilitated further the global exchange of ideas. Experiences that become globalized 
by diaspora communities play a central role in internationalizing sub-nationalist 
movements. Transnational identities play a central role in connecting different areas of 
the globe, and with the proliferation of transportation technology, “geographic borders 
are now less significant and territory less determinant than they once were; crossing…is a 
much less permanent, unidirectional, or irreversible process.”49 
The emergent importance of transnational identities and the persistence of 
national movements that traverse borders indicate that state boundaries and claims to 
nation-state sovereignty are less constitutive of group identity than in the past. Though it 
																																																								
47 Sodaro, “Memorial Museums: the Emergence of a New Form.” Exhibiting Atrocity: Memorial Museums 
and the Politics of Past Violence, 2018, p. 19 
48 Croucher, 2003, p. 11 
49 Ibid, 2003, p. 7 
 	 31	
can be argued that the existence of nations that are dispersed across state borders supports 
the primordialist view of nationalism, it is clear that the technological and political 
changes of the modern era have fomented the emergence of new nations and new 
identities, constructed along notions of belonging within the context of a global 
discourse. In this view, nations are extremely malleable and responsive to information as 
well as global interactions, and the construction of these identities coincides with the 
mnemonic democratization that globalized technology entails.  
Though sub-national movements seeking greater political freedom or guarantees 
of human rights have globalized their projects, the importance of local memory plays an 
integral role in constructing nationalized histories. Global discourse has shaped the 
connections between national liberation movements and their demands for political 
freedom, but liberating the local memory of struggle from silence and preserving those 
memories through public recollection is the central feature of sub-national politics. The 
connections between democratization, nationalism, and memory are readily visible 
through the politics of memory spaces. These include museums, monuments, graves, 
parks, and street signs, among others. They reflect the concurrent relationship between 
the opening of memory discourse within the globalization of technology and politics, 
while also revealing importance of death and space in national consciousness. 
 
National Memory Spaces: Where the Local and Global Meet 
The creation of national monuments, cenotaphs, and other commemoration dates 
or sites are universal to all nationalist projects. This type of public remembrance, a sort of 
secular afterlife, provides continuity between the past and present and utilizes physical 
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space where memory is both learned and experienced. The nation, in the words of 
Avishai Margalit, “is a community that deals with life after death, where the element of 
commemoration verging on revivification is stronger than in a community based merely 
on communication. It is a community that is concerned with the issue of survival through 
memory.”50 Memory spaces are commemorative of stories particularly important to 
group history, chronicling the deeds of national heroes in what Margalit calls the ‘civic 
cult of great men.’ As these sites can be a result of local and national deliberation on the 
one hand, and state indoctrination on the other, memory spaces are an integral aspect of 
discourse and national identity. Stories that are chosen for commemoration underpin the 
construction of identity, and the right of remembering the honorable dead lays at the 
foundation of national belonging. No matter who or what is remembered, memory spaces 
provide an interactive environment where memory and discourse go hand in hand, and 
“they are no longer directed towards posterity so much as they constitute a means of 
influencing contemporary society.”51 At the foundations of cultural memory is the 
collective remembrance of the dead inhabited through physical space. 
When public memory spaces are inhabited by counter memory, they constitute 
what P.J. Brendese calls radical acts of remembrance. “These are memories that preserve 
a memory of agonizing efforts of the intellect and restate the possibilities and threats 
posed by political dilemmas.”52 The use of a public space for rebellious memory 
spatializes subversion from what the state deems available for public recollection. As 
Brendese states, “the polis as a community of memory is…the place where shared 
memories are fashioned, animated, recorded, revised, forgotten, and remembered…It is 																																																								
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also the venue where collective memories become politically salient, mobilized, invoked, 
or repressed.”53 These venues, when occupied by memories of death, oppression, and 
endurance, form the bedrock of sub-national struggles. As they can be graves, places of 
trauma, museums, libraries, and a myriad of other physical markers, subversive memory 
spaces can be leveraged to encourage open public discourse. The power of memories to 
motivate action makes these spaces all the more important for democratic possibilities. 
Though this section emphasizes the connection between memory spaces and 
transitional justice, it is important to note that radical changes in physical space are 
indicative of all ruptures in cultural identity, not just democratic memory projects. “A 
reconstruction of identity always entails a reconstruction of memory, which applies as 
much to communities as it does to individuals. It takes place through the rewriting of 
history books, the demolition of monuments, and the renaming of official buildings, 
streets, and squares.”54 The creation, maintenance, demolition, and transformation of 
memory spaces correspond to animation, continuity, rupture, and revision of political and 
cultural life respectively. These physical transformations of space embody the 
simultaneous currents of remembering and forgetting at a cultural level, and just as they 
can be leveraged for the recovering of repressed memories, they can also become a tool 
for perpetuating power inequalities. 
Simultaneously paradoxical and inspirational is the endurance of private 
memories in an atmosphere of repression. Jelin denotes this phenomenon as ‘evasive 
memory loss,’ and it involves the private transmission, often through the family or 
clandestine social groups, that aim to perpetuate the memory of those who succumb to 																																																								
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violence. “Indeed, could it be that the silence and oblivion that are sought for by 
repressing commemorations have the paradoxical effect of multiplying memories, of 
maintaining alive the questions of debate about the recent past?”55 These private 
memories are the ingredients of public discourse once political spaces open. Deliberation 
on the naming of streets, squares, parks, and other public spaces becomes animated by 
such stories, providing the recovery of once evaded memories. In line with the goals of 
memory democrats like Jelin and Brendese, this deliberation can integrate diverse 
interpretations of major historical persons, dates, and experiences, where “facts fall into 
place and gain a new (dis) order, preexisting models and blue prints break down, [and] 
the voices of new and old generations…create new intersubjective spaces of dialogue.”56 
Such plural discourse is highly representative of nations and states experiencing 
democratic transition, but the transformation of physical space under top-down cultural 
projects subverts this discourse in favor of narrative consensus. In this regard, the process 
of creating memory spaces is often more indicative of political freedom than the stories 
themselves. 
Graves of civic heroes or victims of violence, particularly when they are 
transformed from burial site to monument, “stabilize and authenticate [cultural memory] 
by giving it a concrete setting.”57 Yet these spaces do not constitute memory outright, but 
require human interaction and discourse to become collectively significant. They are 
physical markers that prompt recollection, and what is recollected are stories whose 
meaning varies according to each individual. Rather than signifying a narrative 
consensus, they serve as memory reference points in which various actors and 																																																								
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participants can communicate their own interpretations. Functioning as public spaces of 
discourse rather than unified symbols, they “are charged with mysterious and unspecified 
significance”58 that can only be interpreted by those who remember. 
Monuments, memorials, cenotaphs, commemorative plaques, and official 
buildings all constitute various spaces in which cultural memory, the presence of the 
dead, and democratic possibilities intersect. But the proliferation of national and local 
museums across the world signifies an ongoing trend that blends history, memory, and 
national identity in spaces of a rather modern flare. The collection of one’s national 
history in museums transforms time into physical space, where all the remnants of a 
collective past are put in display for national delight. Though this model still persists 
today, the integration of the museum with human rights dialogue has given way to a new 
form of memory space: the memorial museum. 
What was once a space for the tourism of the nation’s glorious past has become a 
social setting where people come to terms with the legacy of a troubled past. Modern 
memorial museums “are not like their predecessors that dot the landscape of the late 19th 
century—[which were] triumphant reminders of the glories of the nation-state.”59 They 
aim to preserve the memory of violence rather than the memory of golden ages. “Not 
only are they able to collect and display the physical remnants of the past, preserving it 
for posterity, but they can also tell the story of the past, imparting knowledge and 
understanding.”60 These spaces integrate national history, victimhood, and hope in order 
to create meaning out of suffering. “The emergent strength of victims, who today 
increasingly ‘write the history’ in their demands for recognition and reparation, is clearly 																																																								
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due to the growing emphasis on human rights throughout the 20th century.”61 
International organizations and institutions provide generous expertise and assistance in 
the creation of such spaces, making global discourse a central element of their function. 
Underlying the connections between spaces of memory, democratization, and 
nationalism is the ability to freely express political opinions and individual identity. 
Spaces of memory offer such public sites where previously repressed feelings, ideas, and 
stories can be told. The politics of memory, in many ways, is the project of overcoming 
silence. Parks, monuments, museums, and many other spaces offer an avenue to make 
public those private memories previously resigned to oblivion. Any contentious transition 
toward democracy is predicated upon the ability of societies to “find ways to handle the 
tension…in democratic public spaces and institutional settings that recognize the plurality 
of voices and the unavoidable presence of the past.”62 The integration of local memory 
and global discourse further complicates this tension, as more individuals of more diverse 
backgrounds encounter each other on a daily basis, widening the opportunity for conflict.  
For sub-national movements, memory spaces evidence to what end the nation 
exists. Do they desire democratization, human rights, territorial expansion, a state of their 
own, or vengeance? By tracking the development of national memory with respect to 
process and content, one can better understand a community and their opportunities and 
limitations. In the following section, I will examine the development of Kurdish 
nationalism in light if the previous theoretical analysis.
																																																								
61 Ibid, 2018, p. 17 
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Chapter 3 
A Brief Overview of Kurdish History 
Memory as a subject of inquiry cannot be studied, nor provide any beneficial 
conclusions without some historical contextualization. As memories are highly 
subjective, dynamic, and susceptible to embellishment or distortion, providing a 
historical background to frame the mnemonic foreground is necessary to conceptualize 
how nationalism and collective memory concurrently develop. A brief historical account 
will provide the relevant context in which Kurds find themselves today. 
 The specific origin of the Kurds is often disputed, but it can be safely asserted that 
they have existed as a distinct, identifiable group for over 2000 years. They have 
inhabited an area that encompasses the border regions of modern day Turkey, Syria, Iraq, 
and Iran, primarily around the Zagros Mountains and the surrounding plains and valleys. 
Though some trace the etymology of the word ‘Kurd’ back to the ancient Sumerian 
languages over 5,000 years ago,1 it is generally agreed by historians, anthropologists, and 
nationalists alike that the Kurds are descended from Indo-European tribes that crossed 
what is modern Iran in the second millennium B.C. These tribes coexisted for centuries 
with other distinct tribal groups until the Arab invasions in the 7th century in which they 
were subsumed by various empires. The Kurdish tribes enjoyed relative autonomy 
throughout this period, developing distinct linguistic dialects of which four main varieties 
remain. The most common, Kurmaji, is primarily spoken in northern Kurdistan, while 
second most common, Surani, is primarily spoken in the south. The other two dialects, 
Gurani and Zaza, are spoken by small enclaves in southern and north-western regions 
																																																								
1 Öcalan, The Political Thought of Abdullah Öcalan, 2017, p. 4 
 	 38	
respectively. The overwhelming majority of Kurds are Sunni Muslim (75%), yet many 
Kurds living in Iran practice Shia. Other small enclaves practice Alevi Shia and Yezidi, 
which are heavily influenced by the Zoroastrianism of the pre-Islamic period.2 
	
Figure 2: Historically inhabited Kurdish area of the Middle East 
Though estimates of Kurdish populations are difficult to attain due the reluctance 
of states to determine exact figures, the general consensus is that roughly 25-30 million 
Kurds live across the Middle East and in diaspora communities throughout the world 
(predominantly in Europe including Sweden, England, German, and France). There are 
roughly 6 million Kurds in Iraq, amounting to over 15% of the population; 2 million in 
Syria (roughly 10%); 7 million in Iran (8%); and almost half of all Kurds live in Turkey, 
amounting to 13 million and constituting just over 15% of the Turkish population. An 
additional population of roughly 800,00-1,000,000 Kurds lives outside the Middle East.3 
Today, the Kurds represent the largest ethnic group in the world without a state of their 
own. 																																																								
2 McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds, 2005, p. 10  
3 Multiple sources consulted: Kimberly Segall Performing Democracy in Iraq and South Africa p. 4; Mary 
O’Neil Linguistic Human Rights and the Rights of the Kurds p. 74; McDowall p. 3 
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Figure 3: Current Kurdish population distribution of Middle East 
Kurdish groups exercised relative independence for most of their history under 
the organization of emirates (principalities) that lied between the Ottoman and Persian 
empires. These political structures remained independent until the 16th century when 
Sunni Kurdish emirates were persuaded to ally against the Shia Iranians making most of 
Kurdistan subject to the Ottoman Empire. Shia Kurds also became subjects of the Safavid 
and Qajar dynasties. Kurds functioned as a buffer between the two powers, often warring 
with each other as proxies.4  There, until the mid 19th century, the Kurds retained relative 
autonomy under the decentralized Ottoman and Persian systems. Beginning in 1839, 
administration reforms under Sultan Abdulmejid I aimed to centralize the Ottoman 
bureaucratic system. The era of reform destroyed the autonomy of the Kurdish emirates 
and eliminated them as meaningful entities.5 In the absence of the emirates, tribal 
fragmentation led to violent confrontations between Kurds making governance by 
Ottoman officials difficult. “The failure of central power in reconstituting ‘order’ in 
																																																								
4 Romano Divided Nations and European Migration, 2013, p. 193 
5 Ahmadzadeh and Standfield, The Political, Cultural, and Military Re-Awakening of the Kurdish 
Nationalist Movement in Iran, 2010, p. 12 
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Kurdistan resulted in the appearance of new actors called: the sheikhs.”6 These religious 
leaders were the only Kurdish individuals that had the legitimacy to intermediate between 
warring tribes in the increasingly anarchic Kurdistan region. 
The sheikhs became the central leaders of what would be a series of revolts 
against the Ottoman and Persian Empires, and later the Turkish Republic, Iran, Iraq and 
Syria. Important rebellions include the revolts of Sheikh Ubeydullah in the 1870s and 
Sheikh Said in 1925. Other notable revolts include the Simko revolt in Iran and those in 
Agri (1930) and Dersim (1937). Between the years 1925 and 1980 around 20 Kurdish 
rebellions were waged against the Turkish Republic alone.7 The late 19th and 20th century 
revolts constitute a considerable theme in Kurdish history. Though the reasons, 
motivations, and justifications of such revolts are disputed between the Kurds and their 
respective states, they are often major touchstones of collective memory and historical 
narratives.8  
Following WWI and the partition of the Ottoman Empire among the Allied 
governments, the Kurds were briefly ensured autonomy and sovereignty under the Treaty 
of Sevres (1920). However, the resistance of the remaining Ottoman armies under the 
leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk prevented this plan from coming to fruition. The 
victory of Kemal over the allied forces resulted in a negotiated peace under the Treaty of 
Lausanne (1923), which settled the current borders of the Turkish Republic.  
																																																								
6 Yugen, Turkish State Discourse and the Exclusion of Kurdish Identity, 2007, p. 219 
7 Guvenc, Constructive Narratives of Kurdish Nationalism in the Urban Space of Diyarbakir, Turkey, 
2011, p. 27 
8 The dimensions of such debates usually center on whether they were motivated by nationalist, religious, 
or reactionary reasons. I will not add to the debate, as it is largely irrelevant to this study. Rather than 
attempt to discover the historical reasons for rebellion, my interest lies in how these stories are incorporated 
into historical narratives today.  
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The conclusion of WWI brought the splintering of Kurdish groups along the four states 
mentioned earlier: Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria. This fragmentation would stunt Kurdish 
nationalism, preventing the formation of transportation and communication networks 
between Kurds in different states.  
Whereas the process of creating national print languages occurred in Europe 
throughout the 18th and 19th century, the Kurds did not begin this process until the mid 
1900s. The fragmentation of the Kurds into minority groups within four Middle Eastern 
states “greatly exacerbated Kurdish cultural and linguistic divisions”9 in an already 
diverse and largely illiterate population. The mountainous topography and undeveloped 
transportation networks of the Kurdish region meant that individual tribes further 
developed their own oral traditions and dialects putting the Kurds at a structural 
disadvantage vis-á-vis their Turkish, Persian, and Arab nationalist counterparts. 
“Kurdish nationalism therefore lagged behind competing nascent…nationalisms. 
Combined with the economic underdevelopment of Kurdish regions and the 
emerging, strongly centralizing…state bureaucracies in Istanbul (later Ankara), 
Esfahan (later Tehran), Baghdad, and Damascus, Kurdish nationalism remained 
peripheral.”10  
 
Following the end of WWI and the creation of the Turkish Republic, Kurmanji 
speaking Turkish Kurds were educated in state schools using the Latin script. In Iraq, 
Syria, and Iran, however, state education was conducted in either Arabic or Persian, 
meaning that a Kurmanji speaking Kurd in Turkey could not read something written by a 
Kurmanji speaking Kurd in Syria, Iran, or Iraq. As the Kurdish language already had 
sharp divisions between local dialects, the added cleavage between Latin and Arabic 
script posed a major obstacle for intra-Kurdish group communication. Though the first 																																																								
9 Romano, Modern Communcations Technology in Ethnic Nationalist Hands: The Case of the Kurds, 2002 
p. 131 
10 Romano, 2013, p. 194 
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Kurdish newspaper, Kurdistan, was published in Cairo in 1898, its effect was marginal to 
the predominantly illiterate Kurdish population. “It played a profound role in fostering 
national awakening among the literati…However, the literati of the time were no more 
than small circles; they could hardly form a ‘reading public’ as it had emerged in 
Europe.”11  
 The experience of Kurds in Turkey, Iraq, and Iran during the first half of the 20th 
century further stunted nationalist aspirations. Centralization policies in Turkey and Iran 
dissolved tribal structures and aggressively attempted to assimilate the Kurdish 
populations. The failed revolt of Sheikh Said in Turkey in 1925 prompted forced 
resettlement and land reform programs that relocated Kurds to Turkish speaking urban 
areas, resulting in substantial assimilation to Turkish culture and language. The Turkish 
Republic passed such laws as the Settlement Law of 1934, which evacuated Kurdish 
speaking villages and urban areas into Turkish Western Anatolia.12 Numerous failed 
uprisings resulted in forced resettlement, massacres, and the suppression of Kurdish 
language. Little organized resistance in Turkey appeared again until the 1960s.  
While Turkish Kurds were experiencing harsh repression, the relatively open 
political space under the British mandate in Iraq gave Kurds equal status with Arabs. 
Kurdish language rights and tribal structures were respected, meaning that for the most 
part national aspirations went unimagined. Though the open space allowed for some 
Kurdish tribal leaders to advocate nationalist aspirations, “the political space that favored 
																																																								
11 Romano, 2002, p. 132 
12 O’Neil, Linguistic Human Rights and the Rights of the Kurds, 2007, p. 76 
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the traditional stratum encouraged fragmentation, not unification, of Kurdish 
communities.”13  
Kurds in Iran experienced centralization policies similar to Turkey, and in 1946 
the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) established the independent Kurdish Mahabad 
Republic in western Iran. The Republic lasted for only eleven short months when the 
Shah of Iran overthrew the regime by December 1946, leaving Kurdish nationalists 
without much of their former leadership.  
 In the 1950s through the early 1990s various developments across the Kurdish 
region fomented the development of Kurdish national consciousness. The resettlement 
programs in Turkey and mass rural exodus brought many Kurds to urban areas where 
they entered into the skilled artisan and professional work force “swelling the numbers of 
Kurdish mechanics, printers, electricians, lawyers, doctors, and journalists.”14 As the 
Kurdish working class and bourgeoisie began to grow, previously tribal and rural Kurds 
gained greater access to education and participation in Turkish political life. Additionally, 
Kurdish migration to Europe began the creation of a large diaspora population outside the 
Middle East with estimates ranging up to 800,000.15 The more liberal Turkish 
constitution of 1960 allowed somewhat greater freedoms in publishing and cultural 
rights, though Kurdish publications were still often banned. Importation of Kurdish 
literature published in Europe was a central feature of breaking the state monopoly on 
information, and the development of Kurdish nationalism in Turkey was largely within 
the discourse of a European diaspora population. Subsequent 1967 and 1980 
constitutional changes in Turkey cracked down on expressions of Kurdish identity. The 																																																								
13 Natali, 2005, p. 32 
14 Romano, 2002, p. 135 
15 Ibid, 2002, p. 137 
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government changed names of cities, parks, and streets from Kurdish to Turkish, while 
adding strict bans on all publications in Kurdish or even those that mentioned the 
existence of the Kurds. “This violent suppression was accompanied by the disappearance 
of the word ‘Kurd’ from the lexicon, the ban of the Kurdish language… and the denial of 
the right of parents to give Kurdish names to their children.”16  
 The simultaneous currents of Kurdish urban diaspora communities, increased 
literacy, and creation of a working class Kurdish bourgeoisie coincided with substantial 
cultural repression. Rather than hinder Kurdish nationalism, the atmosphere of repression 
in Turkey would serve to politicize Kurds and provide much of the justification for 
Kurdish political consciousness. As David Romano writes, “If people come to feel that 
they suffer repression due to ethnic or religious discrimination, they often come to 
identify more strongly with their ascribed ethnicities, using such identities as tools of 
resistance and community mobilization.”17 Repressive Turkish policies, particularly in 
the 1980s, led to widespread exodus to European countries. “Kurdish asylum seekers in 
Europe led to an increase of publications in Kurdish in the eighties,”18 which served to 
rapidly promote the standardization of the Kurdish language. “Kurmanji texts originally 
published in Sweden and France, ranging from grammars and dictionaries to novels and 
journalistic work”19 were smuggled into the Turkey, Iraq, and Iran through new actors on 
the political scene.  
The emergence of the PKK, a Kurdish militant political party in Turkey, 
facilitated the exchange of literature between Kurds in Europe and other Middle Eastern 																																																								
16 Gocek, Through a Glass Darkly: Consequences of a Politicized Past in Contemporary Turkey, 2008, p. 
93 
17 Romano, 2013, p. 197 
18 Phillips, Cyberkurds and Cyberkinetics: Pilgrimage in the Age of Virtual Mobility, 2007, p. 10 
19 Romano, 2002, p. 138 
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states. A civil war between the Turkish state and the PKK throughout the 80s and 90s 
further politicized Kurdish identity increasing the importance of European publications. 
The London based Kurdish journal Ronahi published the following anecdote by a 
Kurdish student in the 1980s: 
“Several months ago, with a friend, I went to the British Library… to look for a 
book written by Ahmadi Khani (1650-1706)… The manuscript… (a metrical 
Arabic-Kurdish dictionary for children) was written in the beginning of the 1700s 
and while we were looking through the faded pages I was lost in thought... After 
almost three hundred years, two students from different parts of Kurdistan were 
for the first time coming across a book of a leading Kurdish poet and scholar in a 
library in London. If there is a disgrace for the Kurds, is this not enough?”20 
   
Kurdish repression in Iraq and Iran during this period was far less tied to 
linguistic and cultural rights, but rather political expression. The expulsion of the British 
from Iraq in 1958 began a decades long period of state-led Arab nationalism that would 
highly centralize Iraqi bureaucratic structures and the economy, spurring the development 
Kurdish political consciousness. The nationalization of Iraqi oil reserves in 1971 and the 
subsequent quadrupling of oil prices in the 1973 oil crisis made predominantly Kurdish 
inhabited, oil-rich areas in the north essential for the increasingly powerful Baghdad.21 
Between the 1970s and 1990s, Iraqi state policy—led by the Arab nationalist Ba’thist 
party—destroyed what remained of the autonomous Kurdish tribal authority. “They 
destroyed Kurdish villages and forced Kurdish families to resettle in alternative 
governorates, southern desert areas, or collective towns.”22 The regime of Saddam 
Hussein, in the same vain of Turkish policy, went to great lengths to de-ethnicize the 
Kurdish population. Though government texts were printed in Kurdish, “Hussein’s 
multibillion dollar rewriting of history project…and the Mosul spring festivals 																																																								
20 Ibid, 2002, p. 137 
21 Natali, 2005, p. 58 
22 Ibid, 2005, p. 58 
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highlighted the Mesopotamian role in Iraqi history and called for ethnic minorities to 
view themselves as Iraqis first.”23 By 1984, there were over 225 textbook titles available 
in Kurdish, yet they contained “no mention of the [term] ‘Kurd’… anywhere in Iraqi 
history.”24 Between 1987 and 1988, Hussein directed the infamous Anfal campaigns as a 
part of larger “Arabization” policies.25 Over 4,000 Kurdish villages were attacked 
resulting in the death of 150,000 people and the disappearance of another 180,000. The 
most egregious of these attacks was in the village of Halabja, where roughly 5,000 people 
were killed instantly by poison gas in March of 1988.26 This site remains a flashpoint for 
Kurdish political memory and will be revisited later. 
Iraqi assimilation policy worked similarly to Turkish policy in that it heightened a 
sense of Kurdishness in response to violence. Much like the Kurds situated between the 
Ottoman and Persian empires, the 1970s and 1980s was a time of intra-Kurdish 
fighting—often as proxies for the Iranian and Iraqi governments. The Kurdistan 
Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) were the 
predominant political institutions representing the Kurds in Iraq and Iran. The leaders 
Mullah Mustafa Barzani and Jalal Talabani respectively, had orchestrated numerous 
failed revolts and attacks on the Iraqi regime throughout the mid 20th century, particularly 
in the 70s and 80s. The KDP in Iran (KDPI) had long been exiled into Iraq under the 
Iranian Shah following the failed Mahabad Republic. However, at the outset of the 
Iranian Revolution, the KDP returned to Iran and declared it would fight against the Iraqi 																																																								
23 Ibid, 2005, p. 59 
24 Kirmanj, Kurdish History Textbooks: Building a Nation-State within a Nation-State, 2014, p. 370 
25 Arabization in Iraq was a policy of forced relocation and cultural “arabization” of ethnic minorities in the 
country. They were implemented by the Ba’thist Party of Iraq from roughly 1960-2000. The al-Anfal 
campaign was an example of such policies, where in 1988 the Iraqi government chemically attacked 
Kurdish villages in the north. See footnote 26 for sources. 
26 Natali, 2005 pp. 58-59; and Phillips, 2007, p. 10 
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state in return for autonomy. The Iranian government ignored this request and intensified 
attacks on the Kurdish population even further.27 Kurds in Iran and Iraq moved back and 
forth across state borders as a result of attacks on villages and military confrontations 
during the Iran-Iraq War. 
The cessation of violence between Iraq and Iran in 1988, and the political 
transition following the American invasion of the Gulf War in the early 1990s brought 
about substantial opening in Iraqi political space. Furthermore, Turkey’s bid in the late 
1980s for EU accession prompted marginal openings in Kurdish policy in 1991, which 
would have a profound effects on liberalizing Kurdish communication within and across 
state borders. Though Iran would not see such political openings, the proliferation of 
modern communication technology would connect them to nationalist Kurds in other 
states. 
Looking back at the 20th century, Turkish Kurds have generally resisted state-
centralization efforts through many revolts and in a civil war during the 1980s and 1990s 
led by the PKK. Kurds in Iraq lagged behind their Turkish counterparts due to the more 
open political space prior to the late 1960s, but have since become politically mobilized. 
Since the American invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Kurds have gained political recognition 
through the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)—a democratic autonomous region 
within the Federal State of Iraq. In Iran, the Kurds have had little success following the 
Mahabad Republic. Yet as state borders become more easily crossed through 
transportation and communication technology, Kurds in Iran are exposed to the 
developments across state lines. Until recently, Kurdish identity largely developed in 
distinct ways in relation to state policies and political space. Ample scholarship has 																																																								
27 Ahmadzadeh and Stansfield, 2010, p. 20 
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examined Kurdish national identity formation within individual state boundaries, as well 
as comparatively. Most studies highlight the ways in which these identities are 
differentiated by the prevailing cultural and political space of each state (Vali 2011; 
Natali 2005; Entessar 1992; O’Ballance 1996). As Denise Natali writes:  
“Kurds have tried to protect their identity by differentiating themselves from the 
dominant ethnic group. Kurds are Kurds because they are not Arabs, Persians, or 
Turks… Although Kurdish communities have maintained some shared sense of 
nationalism, Kurdayeti has become a part of a larger repertoire of identities based 
on the nature of the political space in each state.”28 
  
 The central focus of my inquiry into Kurdish nationalism is the ways in which 
their collective memory has been expressed and formed—exclusively in an era in which 
ideas, information, and people can more easily cross state borders. As a result, I am much 
less concerned in identifying what differentiates Kurdish identity, but rather how this 
“shared sense of nationalism” is expressed through cultural memory, spaces, and 
narratives. The integration of globalized technology and Kurdish nationalism has led the 
charge in facilitating such dialogue. Radio and television would come to define the 
landscape of national consciousness, promoting the creation of and identification with 
Kurdish collective memory during the final decades of the 20th century. Subsequently, the 
Internet has come to play a substantial role in connecting various Kurdish groups across 
state borders and further integrating diaspora nationalism with local nationalism. As a 
result, communication technology rather than print language is the defining medium for 
the intensification of Kurdish national memory and consciousness.  
 
 
																																																								
28 Natali, The Kurds and the State, 2005, p. xvii 
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Chapter 4 
Kurdish Memory: Technology, Globalization, and Space 
Introduction   
The politics of sub-national movements, as has been argued, is uniquely tied to 
collective memory. The Kurdish struggle—analyzed through the recovery of repressed, 
forgotten, or disavowed memories—reveals the extent to which democracy, trauma, and 
nationalism have evolved together under the penetrating forces of globalization and 
international governance. The ongoing discourse surrounding Kurdish memory signifies 
that the past remains salient in the minds of those who experienced—and still 
experience—political violence. Kurdish identity, though many argue spans back 
millennia, is still, and in my opinion perpetually being (re) imagined. As Abdul Aziz Said 
wrote, “much of the literature of the Kurds seems to be written by uncritical lovers or 
unloving critics,”1 and I must admit that I am neither. Far from an encomium to the 
Kurdish plight, I hope to highlight how coming to terms with the past, 
vergangenheitsbewältigung, is at the center of contemporary Kurdish political 
consciousness across the Middle East.  
The manner in which this is done, the parameters of its discourse, and the goals 
that collective memory communicates are hardly uniform in Kurdish life. However, by 
examining the varying contexts and expression of Kurdish memory, one can elucidate 
some overarching themes to their identity while simultaneously revealing persistent 
difficulties in transitioning from a community of struggle to a community that values 
democracy, freedom, and peace.  
																																																								
1 Said, Perspective of Abdul Aziz Said, Director, Center for Global Peace, American University, 2007 p. 30 
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This section will begin by tracing the formation of Kurdish memory with respect 
to globalized technologies such as radio, TV, and the Internet. As these forces have 
brought together local and global currents, the role of international organizations and 
actors will be subsequently analyzed. The final element of this section will look at 
Kurdish memory spaces and their role in the development of political consciousness. 
 
Radio Songs, Stories, and TV: New Avenues for Discourse and Subversion 
In the early 1990s, communication technology began to take on a central role in 
Kurdish discourse, the standardization of language, and the dissemination of modern 
Kurdish culture. Though radio expanded its role considerably following Turkish political 
opening and the creation of the democratic Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) in 
Iraq—1991 and 1992 respectively—the Iranian and Iraqi governments had previously 
leveraged public broadcasting in Kurdish in order to foment instability in each other’s 
territory. Echoing the common phrase, “you love all the Kurds except your own,” radio 
was a formative tool in state foreign policy. KDP broadcasting in Iran around the late 
1950s, with the help of the Soviet Union, exemplifies how even limited radio inspired 
national consciousness well before its widespread adoption. During the short-lived 
Republic of Mahabad in Iran, songs, anthems, and poetry animated Kurdish radio 
programming in the ephemeral Republic. The revival of those anthems and songs through 
radio broadcasting in the late 1950s rekindled national consciousness in many Iranian 
Kurds. In an interview conducted by Zohreh Sullivan, Iranian Kurd Rebwar Kurdi 
(pseudo.) explained one of his first ‘nationalist’ memories: 
“Let me tell you about another memory, a radio memory of nationalism. This was 
Radio Cairo. For the first time after the Republic, there was a radio station that 
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aired the Kurdish national anthem, Kurdish revolutionary songs, and Kurdish 
literature and poetry—all of which had been illegal. It began in 1957 with a daily 
half hour program in Kurdish—so important to the life of the Kurds. Everyone 
went home to listen to this program.”2 
 
As the Kurds continued to urbanize, migrate to Europe, and integrate into their 
respective economies throughout the latter haft of the 20th century, radio took on a greater 
role in constructing counter narratives. By 1991, radio—and soon satellite TV—
normalized the use of Kurdish among populations who had previously experienced 
intense assimilation into the broader Arab, Turkish, and Persian majorities. Radio 
continued to be an integral source of anti-state discourse, though mostly mediated 
through Iranian Kurdish political parties, which were under considerable threat of state 
violence. For example, the KDPI established Voice of Kurdistan in 1980, and by 1995 it 
had been relocated five times due to security issues.  
By the 1990s, Iranians slowly began to use satellite TV as a substitution for 
Iranian official information; by 2006, Kurdish parties in Iran set up their own television 
channels that increased national consciousness and mobilized Kurds against the state. 
“Iranian Kurds followed satellite TV channels, and these contributed to the formation of a 
new national discourse… Previously, the Kurdish parties reached the public 
through…limited radio…based in Iraqi Kurdistan…. Now the arrival of digital satellite 
TV broadcasting has revolutionized the parties’ ability to communicate with their 
public.”3 These capabilities allowed Kurdish groups to publicize evidence of state 
violence and more quickly mobilize people to protest the state. One of these instances 
occurred in 2005 when the Iranian state murdered a Kurdish activist in Mahabad. Images 
of his lynched and tortured body led to immediate protests and riots throughout the 																																																								
2 Sullivan, Exiled Memories, 2001, p. 100 
3 Ahmadzadeh and Stansfield, 2010, pp. 23-24 
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Middle East. Various TV broadcasting networks including Tishk TV (based in Paris), the 
Kurd Channel (based in London), Rojhelat TV (based in Sweden), which are closely 
connected with specific Iranian Kurdish parties, broadcast the images in an effort to 
challenge Iranian state authority. The impact of these networks is difficult to understate, 
as they constitute direct challenges to official narratives and provide avenues through 
which Kurdish consciousness can develop divorced from state interference.  
The establishment of the KRG in Iraq in 1992, followed by intra-party violence 
between the PUK and the KDP meant that radio was predominantly used to mobilize 
Kurds for partisan purposes. From 1992 to 1997, the Iraqi Kurdish Civil War proved 
divisive for the Kurdish masses, yet stories and songs on the radio began to address the 
preceding decades, helping to forge collective memory and alleviate intra-Kurdish 
animosity. The democratic KRG created relative stability compared to the violent 
campaigns of the 1980s, and economic aid to the Kurds following the Gulf War, though 
marginal, facilitated the proliferation of radio and satellite TV technology. This 
technology would introduce Iraqi Kurds to Kurds from Turkey, Iran, and Syria, while 
creating public forms of collective catharsis.  
Shivan Perwer, a Turkish Kurd and musician who fled Diyarbakir in 1976, 
mourned the deaths of those chemically attacked in Halabja in 1988. His song, a popular 
tune across state lines, signifies the trans-state national discourse that increasingly 
energizes Kurdish collective memory.4  
Dîsa dîrok xwe nû ve di ke, we ke çarek dinê ji çaran e.  Again history repeats itself, a    
      time like those of the     
      past 
We ke Diyarbekir, we ke Palo û Gênç,   Like (the time in) Diyarbekir     
      (Amed), like Palo      
      and Genj 																																																								
4 Translation from https://medyamagazine.com/genocide-lyrics-music-death/ 
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We ke Agirî, Dêrsim, we ke Mahabad û we ke Barzan e.  Like Agiri, Dersim,     
      like Mahabad and Barzan 
 
The passage encapsulates the grief of an era, suspending temporal and spatial 
boundaries, equating the suffering of those in Halabja with the victims of violence in 
Diyarbakir, Turkey, and Mahabad, Iran. “Popular songs—as embodied memories—offer 
an alternative to cognition, an important mechanism amidst trauma.”5 Kurdish radio, 
though it triggers traumatic memory, does so for the purpose of building group solidarity 
and connoting the determination of the Kurds to survive. One of the final sections of the 
song prompts Kurdish unity, though not for the sake of revenge or violence.6 
 
Hawar Kurdno, hûnê bi kin? Bi lezînin!     Oh Kurds, you’ll do it? Quickly! 
 
Hûnê kaxiz û pênûsekê bi bînin, bi nivsînin dunya alemê pê bi hesînin!  Bring your paper and pen,   
        write and make the world aware (of  
        your strife)! 
Serok û rêberên Kurda li hev bînin.      Unite the leaders and heads of Kurds. 
 
Bila yek bi yek bin, ji halê me Kurda re tiştekî ji dinyayê re bi nivsînin!  (So) Together they can, for the sake of  
        us Kurds write (about our strife) for the 
        world! 
 
His mandate—to write—echoes the essence of the Kurdish project: to create a 
history for themselves. These radio songs traverse state borders in a manner that presents 
Kurdish identity as a form of collective healing rather than a political value. Perwer, 
undoubtedly the most influential artist in contemporary Kurdish music, does not see unity 
as a vehicle for state aspirations, but as a way to fulfill the duty to remember. “As singing 
provides evidence of surviving voices, songs cantor the national imagination, assuring its 
besieged bearers of a greater communal bond.”7 
																																																								
5 Segall, “Radio Songs, Kurdish Stories, Videos: Politics of Healing After Ethnic Cleansing,” 2013, pp. 10 
6 https://medyamagazine.com/genocide-lyrics-music-death/ 
7 Segall, 2013, pp. 18 
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Under the internationally supported no fly zones in Kurdistan during the mid 
1990s, the KDP and PUK waged a civil war under economic isolation from Baghdad. 
While division between Kurdish groups was exacerbated, TV and radio became a 
platform for reconciliation once peace arrived. Following the cessation of intra-Kurd 
violence in 1997 and the resultant peace agreement between the PUK and the KDP, 
Kurdish media opportunities additionally expanded to TV and the Internet. The relative 
stability of Kurdish party relations in Iraq under the democratic KRG transformed media 
from a partisan tool into collective national medium. Stories, poems, and songs 
disseminated through radio and TV recalled ancient and modern Kurdish memories—one 
of which has emerged as formative Kurdish narrative. The story of Salahaddin, still a 
common Kurdish name, evokes the memory of the ancient Kurdish King’s conquest of 
Jerusalem. As the story goes, Salahadin let King Richard go free after arresting him upon 
capturing the city. As the European Crusaders were known to kill Jews and Muslims 
alike, the story invokes a Kurdish tradition of forgiveness and reconciliation through 
memory.8 By selectively forgetting recent animosity, and remembering the myth of 
reconciliation, Kurdish memory provides collective conciliatory patters, which are 
translated into tolerance and acceptance of former enemies. Though tensions still exists 
between Kurds in Iraq—mainly regarding the destruction of villages by Kurdish political 
parties and the desire of families to return—Kurdish collective memory narrates a story 
of forgiveness and solidarity which has come to stabilize their ongoing democratic 
project. 
Following the overthrow of Saddam Hussein by American forces in 2003 and the 
numerous international development programs aiming to assist the economy of Iraqi 																																																								
8 Ibid, 2013, pp. 25 
 	 55	
Kurdistan, satellite dishes, radios, and TV became essential purchases for Kurdish 
families. Songs were a crucial force in establishing solidarity among the Kurds against 
Hussein, and the following radio song exemplifies such a media project: “But Saddam 
Hussein, go and build your castles, but you will not stay there!/ You have tried to build 
castles where Alexander the Great failed!”9 Helping forge a collective memory, these 
songs played on radio and TV for hours during the American invasion and after 
Saddam’s capture. 
While Iraqi Kurds utilized TV to overthrow the Ba’thist regime, Kurdish 
television broadcasting began nearly a decade earlier with MED-TV, a London and 
Belgium based program known as the arm of the PKK in Turkey. Political opening in 
Turkey in the early 90s only allowed for state approved media programming in 
Kurdish—which was limited to 45 minutes per day, 4 hours per week on radio and 30 
minutes per day, two hours a week on television. Furthermore, the same programs 
translated in Turkish had to follow radio programs broadcasted in the Kurdish language, 
and TV programs in other languages were legally required to have Turkish subtitles.10 
This marginal opening, likely a conciliatory gesture under the pressure of EU accession, 
hardly satisfied Kurdish thirst for information on national culture and consciousness. 
Instead, broadcasts from Europe operated under greater freedom of political expression, 
meaning that diaspora populations took over a central role in media campaigns against he 
Turkish state. MED-TV served as the primary tool to fight the Turkish monopoly on 
information and media.  
“For the first time in their divided history, the Kurdish people can see their own 
lives, their own reality, reflected on the television screen across the world. Iranian 																																																								
9 Ibid, 2013, pp. 21 
10 O’Neil, 2007, pp. 78 
 	 56	
Kurds can speak to Turkish Kurds in phone-ins, and Iraqi Kurds can see how 
fellow Kurds live in Europe.  For a few hours every night, the world’s largest 
stateless nation has a home.”11 
 
The medium of TV provided integration of all Kurdish groups, no matter if you 
were tuning in from Iran, Turkey, Germany, or Iraq. Furthermore, the name ‘MED’-TV 
ostensibly referred to the Turkish word ‘medya’ (meaning media), but there is no doubt 
that in the minds of the Kurds watching, MED referenced the ancient Medes civilization 
from which the Kurds imagined themselves descendents.  
MED-TV broadcasts a “plethora of news and political programs to children 
shows, music, drama, and documentaries.”12 Though they predominantly broadcast in 
Kurmanji, they have programs in Surani, Turkish, Zaza, Persian, Aramaic, and Arabic. In 
direct violation of Turkish law, they challenge official government interpretation of 
events and as a result MED-TV’s license has been revoked in Europe numerous times 
due to pressure from the Turkish government. With even more power than radio or print 
media, MED-TV has broken down barriers of Kurdish society and played an integral role 
in the formation of national consciousness. As one Turkish Kurd stated, “The station got 
Kurds to understand each other. It also started to bridge dialects. People got used to 
different dialects and religious sects.”13 No doubt MED-TV gets some of the credit when 
anthropologist Diane King observed the following exchange on a flight from Germany to 
Iraqi Kurdistan: “An older Surani-speaking couple greeted [a] young family who 
answered in Kurmanji…In the shuttle was Kurdistan, reconnecting.”14 
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 During the Turkish Civil War with the PKK in the mid-1990s, a new memory 
surfaced in Diyarbakir, the most populated Kurdish city in the world. Located in the 
Southern Kurdish region of Turkey, Diyarbakir is home to both 1.5 million Kurds and 
some of their most salient memories. The Revolt of Sheikh Said in 1925 resulted in the 
execution of the Kurdish leaders by hanging in Dagkapi Square, a central location in the 
middle of the city. Not only was the rebellion summarily crushed, but also the Sheikh and 
his followers were thrown into a ditch, covered with concrete, and denied an identifiable 
burial site. The whereabouts of his body remain unknown. Nearly one hundred years 
later, Kurdish activists attempted to organize a memorial ceremony in order to press the 
government for the location of the Sheikh’s body. The governor banned the ceremony 
and ordered police to forcibly disperse anyone who congregated in the square.  
 The Sheikh’s memory regained significance in the early 1990s as a symbol of 
protests against the Turkish state. Though many scholars debate the motivations of the 
revolt—whether religious, tribal, or nationalist—modern Kurdish memory discourse has 
fashioned the Sheikh within the narrative of struggle against Turkish repression. The 
refusal of the Turkish Republic to grant him a proper burial, rather than erase his 
memory, has actually contributed to his mythic story. The missing grave symbolizes the 
brutality of a state that extends into the afterlife, and a “messianic story of struggle” that 
serves as a building block of Kurdish collective memory.15 In the absence of evidence of 
his body, Kurdish memory has filled the oblivion with miraculous stories passed down 
from generation to generation and disseminated through media. “Many believe that the 
rope that the executioner used to hang him broke. Some say three times….The Sheikh’s 
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execution was possible only when he ordered the rope to break.”16 This myth, and I feel 
confident in calling it that, demonstrates how major historical events become transformed 
and updated through collective memory to serve the present. The symbol of a man who is 
sovereign over his own death challenges the sovereignty of the Turkish state, symbolized 
by the executioner. This memory’s emergence in the midst of a decades-long civil war 
with the PKK is no coincidence. The PKK’s involvement with diaspora communities in 
Europe and MED-TV gave them a platform to create national symbols, one of which was 
the image of Sheikh Said. “The images of Sheikh Said and other past Kurdish leaders 
were repeatedly used in the opening and closing scenes of the movement’s Brussels 
based…satellite station.”17  
Violence throughout the late 1980s and 1990s heavily securitized the southeast 
region of Anatolia (OHAL) under a federal state of emergency in Turkey spanning from 
1987-2002. Under founding leader Abdullah Öcalan, the PKK was known for targeting 
Turks and Kurds alike, calling assimilated Kurds the greatest threat to the national 
liberation movement. Though the PKK mobilized tens of thousands of supporters in 
Turkey and in Europe, it failed to garner widespread popular support in Anatolia. What it 
did do, through MED-TV and other platforms, was politicize Kurdish consciousness after 
decades of Kurdish assimilation in Turkey. “The human cost of the PKK terror also 
included a new generation whose image [was] shaped by OHAL terror conditions. 
Sources of livelihood in the region… were destroyed…and approximately 1 million 
people were relocated to big cities for security reasons.”18 As forced relocation of Kurds 
had done decades earlier, urbanization and the destruction of Kurdish rural villages 																																																								
16 Ibid, 2013, pp. 204 
17 Ibid, 2013, pp. 213 
18 Yavuz, Five Stages of Kurdish Nationalism in Turkey, 2007, pp. 67-68 
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further integrated Turkish and Kurdish political discourse. It was in the midst of such 
circumstances that the memory of Sheikh Said developed—and even Kurdish critics of 
PKK terror tactics began to discuss Kurdish linguistic and cultural rights. 
“Television images have emerged as the most power communication medium, 
able to reach the population instantaneously, even the illiterate, and proving more capable 
of stirring up emotion than print and oral communications alone.”19 By 1999, according 
to BBC news, MED-TV had nearly 10 million daily viewers.20 In typical collective 
memory fashion, the symbol of Sheikh Said temporally blended two distinct resistance 
movements, abstracting the essence of 1925 to 1995. As MED-TV programming usually 
began with an image of the Sheikh, they “typically ended with ended with Öcalan’s 
photo, completing the historical chain of Kurdish leadership and turning Öcalan into the 
last Kurdish leader.”21 Despite the PKK’s lack of support from the Kurdish masses, 
MED-TV plugged previously fragmented and depoliticized Kurds into a nationalist 
discourse.  
The capture and arrest of Öcalan in 1999 fomented widespread outcry from both 
PKK supporters and non-violent Kurds. He was put on a plane in Nairobi, Kenya at 
roughly 2:00 AM, and by 5:00 AM protests by Kurds around the world began at the 
behest of television broadcasting in Europe. The dimension of these protests was both 
international and simultaneous.  “It is significant that not only Turkish Kurds 
demonstrated in solidarity with Öcalan. Major Kurdish protests erupted in Iraq and 
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Iranian Kurdistan as well… This points to the catalyzing effect that television images of 
Öcalan’s capture had on most Kurds, including non-supporters of the PKK.”22  
Since the 1980s, Iraqi Kurds had become politicized and increasingly connected 
with Turkish and Iranian discourses through communication technology. Radio and TV 
facilitated the destruction of linguistic and mnemonic barriers between Kurdish dialect 
communities, different religious sects, and classes. The proliferation of digital and 
Internet technology in the late 1990s and early 2000s would further propel the integration 
of Kurdish discourse within the Middle East, as well as with the Kurdish experience in 
Europe. Digital technology, even more so than radio and TV, has globalized the Kurdish 
issue and connected Kurds with audiences around the world. As radio and television 
gives Kurds the chance to broadcast their experience to an audience, the Internet provides 
a space where information and dialogue can go back and forth creating a virtual forum 
for the exchange of ideas and memories.  
 
The Internet: Public Information and Globalized Memory 
 In 1952, Rebwar Kurdi—the same interviewee who recalled his memory of Radio 
Cairo—went to the National Assembly library in Iran after lobbying his high school 
administration for a note to apply for a membership card. After receiving the card, he 
perused the shelves until he saw an Encyclopedia Britannica, which was not available at 
his school.  
“I remember my excitement. I still remember when I asked for the volume J to K, 
which was volume 13. And when I opened it, I still remember the feeling of being 
overjoyed with seeing an article in English about the Kurds, their history and 
geography… From that moment on, this library was my place.”23 																																																								
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Rebwar’s struggle to access basic information is somewhat anachronistic in an 
age characterized by an explosion of information. Access to public knowledge is an 
essential element of performing democracy, and the Kurds have employed Internet 
technology’s potential for exactly that purpose. The global connections between Kurds in 
America, Europe, and Kurdistan are an essential feature of the continuously developing 
Kurdish political space. Much in the same way as radio and television—though at much 
faster speeds and in more complex networks—the Internet is a primary tool for 
subverting state control over information. In this virtual space, Kurdish people can 
exchange memories, stories, and information not only with other Kurds, but also with an 
increasingly interested global community. “New communications technology does not 
only erode the concept of sovereignty but also offers a new space for marginalized groups 
to overcome their arbitrary divisions by nation-states.”24  
In the era of globalization, exporting documents, photos, videos, and personal 
narratives of state violence to the global community through the Internet has come to 
form the landscape of Kurdish resistance in the last two decades. Collective memory of 
the Kurds is forming on a number of websites that garner support of fellow nationalists 
and populations of states that are friendly or sympathetic to the Kurdish struggle. “Before 
1995, the number of Kurdish websites numbered less than 20; in January 2001, an 
AltaVista keyword search of ‘Kurd’ drew 29,463 references—75 of the first 100 of which 
were referred to either news articles on the Kurds or to Kurdish websites.”25 Today, if 
you search ‘Kurd’ on Google, over 19 million sources are available in the blink of an eye. 
The first page yields links to YouTube videos documenting the history of the Kurds and 																																																								
24 Yavuz, A Preamble to the Kurdish Question, pp. 20 
25 Romano, 2002, pp. 138 
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personal video blogs of Kurdish people around the world; websites of institutions devoted 
to collective information on Kurdish history, politics, and language;26 and sites where 
entire lists of high traffic Kurdish websites, radio stations, and TV programs are compiled 
for digital inquiry.27  
Sites like ‘historyofkurd.com’ transports the digital tourist through Kurdistan’s 
history using images, videos, blog posts, online music, and interviews with leading 
Kurdish intellectuals. One of the most interesting of these websites belongs to the 
Kurdish Project, a collaborative effort between Kurdish-American entrepreneur Farhad 
Khosravi and numerous non-profit digital agencies. The website features tabs to news 
articles, history lessons, Kurdish fun-fact quizzes, and numerous other cultural education 
tools. The most prominent feature of the website is the section that focuses on personal 
stories and experiences of Kurdish people around the world. Clicking on the ‘People and 
Stories’ tab brings you to the following mission: 
“We believe that one of the best ways to improve cross cultural understanding is 
by getting to know real people and hearing their personal stories. We aim to show 
the cultural similarities and differences between Kurds and other countries 
through personal stories, photo essays, interviews, videos, and art projects. We 
hope that you can learn more about what it means to be Kurdish, by reading the 
following stories and insights. This blog is curated by The Kurdish Project, and 
contains stories and insights written about Kurds, user generated content, and 
interviews with Kurds that we’ve conducted. Please share your own Kurdish story 
today!”28 
 
 The website is filled with hyperlinks to submission pages where Kurds can upload 
photos of themselves, their family, and their homes, as well as submit personally written 																																																								
26 The Kurdish Institute in Paris is one such organization. Founded in 1983, it is “an independent, non-
political, secular organization, embracing Kurdish intellectuals and artists from different horizons as well as 
Western specialists on Kurdish Studies.” Numerous Kurdish organizations dot the European digital 
landscape as diaspora communities have leveraged their political freedom to institutionalize the study of 
the Kurds. https://www.institutkurde.org/en/institute/ 
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28 https://thekurdishproject.org/stories-from-kurdistan/ 
 	 63	
stories. It additionally compiles published articles from major media news outlets on the 
Kurds. The personal stories are individual memories and narratives that generate user 
comments and facilitate exchange between Kurds interested in connecting to the outside 
world, diaspora Kurds yearning for information of the homeland, and non-Kurds 
interested in learning more about a group increasingly referenced in Western media. 
There is a section called “Women in Kurdistan” devoted to telling the stories of female 
fighters engaged in struggle against ISIS and the Syrian Regime, the experience of 
women in Iraqi Kurdistan, and many other vignettes into Kurdish life. Recurrently 
referencing human rights discourse, these sights overtly aim to simultaneously export the 
image of Kurdistan’s traumatic history and incipient modernity. 
 
Figure 4: Kurdish Project website graphics. (Left) Percentage of women in the military. (Right) Percentage of 
women serving in KRG public offices. 
As Martin Van Bruinessen notes, “The Kurdistan on the ground has been 
supplemented with a Kurdistan of the airwaves and in cyberspace, and much of the 
Kurdish nationalist struggle is going on in the latter.”29 A major difference between the 
potentialities of Internet discourse and radio or TV is that cyberspace is a structurally 
decentralized space. Whereas tuning into a Kurdish TV broadcast or radio station gives 
you access to one narrative at a time, the Internet provides a space that integrates 																																																								
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numerous different perspectives into one forum. Rather than a space of a single narrative, 
it is a space of debate and discourse where memories can be discussed and worked over.  
‘Halabjavictimssociety.org’ is one of these sites where Kurdish collective memory is 
made. The site, which provides links to documentaries like Halabja’s Lost Son and 
personal stories of the victims, is one of many platforms where Kurds and non-Kurds 
“are affected by the images, becoming witnesses and creating a collective memory of 
shared experience for all those Internet users who have visited such Halabja sites.”30  
For both Kurds and non-Kurds living outside of the Middle East, the Internet is a 
kind of virtual pilgrimage where Kurdish nationalism simultaneously forms and reacts to 
discourse from all over the world. The concentration on documenting and exchanging 
personal stories and photos helps to preserve Kurdish memories in the digital world, often 
in places far outside the reach of state power, and divorced from party affiliation. 
“Whereas many offline gatherings are grouped in political party affiliations, or other 
distinguishing categories,” the Internet provides a domain where people “protest, learn, 
develop common opinions, take action, disagree—but most importantly, become a part of 
a connected network.”31 The implications of such connectivity and pluralistic discourse 
radically transform the Kurdish national memory space into something wholly different 
than national movements of the past. Abdul Aziz Said wrote: 
“A sustained dialogue… is needed among the Kurds themselves… Cultural 
differences needed to be appreciated by all. New visions of pluralistic societies 
beyond the nation-state are needed. Globalization and supernationalism must 
provide for the survival of pluralistic societies. The collapse of distance has 
resulted in the domestication of international politics and the internationalization 
of domestic politics. What is needed is valuing the other’s identity at the group 
level as well as at the individual level.”32 																																																								
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 The Internet has provided such a medium for sustained dialogue. In the Iraq under 
the KRG, ongoing transition to, and consolidation of, democracy has elevated the region 
to a cultural hub of Kurdish nationalism. Since the end of the Kurd Civil War between 
the PUK and KDP, persistent violence in Syria, Iran, and Turkey has prompted many to 
relocate to Iraqi Kurdistan. In this new political space, “satellite television, significant 
flows of people and goods, mobile phones and the Internet are all features of daily life.”33  
In this sustained dialogue, diaspora nationalism and homeland nationalism 
continue to blend through physical and virtual mobility, a trend that “facilitates imagining 
an inclusive Kurdish nationhood.”34 This inclusivity is not, however, predicated on 
homogeny. Digital networks are “much more polyphonic, offering space for dissenting 
opinions to be aired, shared, and contested.”35 Personal blogs animate much of the 
Kurdish Internet presence, making flows of information much more individualized and 
unofficial. The global export of Kurdish narratives through sites like 
‘kurdishblogger.com’ integrate Kurdish Turks, Iranian, Iraqis, Syrians, Yezidi, foreign 
nationals, and non-Kurdish activists for the purpose of internationalizing the Kurdish 
issue. As the website states:  
“’kurdishblogger.com’ is a comment and analysis space which focuses on the 
Kurdish region and Iran, Iraq, Syria and Turkey. Our team also assists 
international news organizations who cover the region. Our research has… been 
used by human rights organizations including Amnesty International, Human 
Rights Watch, Human Rights Organization of Kurdistan and the Iran Human 
Rights Documentation Centre.”36 
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Hundreds of these blogs and forums function as individual media outlets, ensuring 
that all Kurdish voices are heard, and more importantly, are exported to the global stage. 
With the Internet comes “new options for gender and kin relations, new institutional 
forms, and new citizenship possibilities.”37 Even though the Kurdish people do not 
constitute a cohesive, homogenous nation, online activity defies the primacy of state 
power through “a multi-local platform for interaction and social transformation that is 
equipped to include difference and dissent.”38 Particularly in the KRG, the Kurdistan 
region is beginning to look more and more like the Western democracies that it connects 
with through TV, radio, and the Internet.  
 
International Organizations and Kurdish National Discourse  
Along with these media connections, international organizations and actors have 
influenced Kurdish national consciousness and memory politics. Denise Natali wrote in 
2005, “Transnational space has also helped institutionalize Kurdayeti at an international 
level. [This] space offers Kurdish nationalists access to a larger political arena to make 
their nationalist claims without fear of repression and for a relatively continuous amount 
of time.”39 International connections, both through media and institutional collaboration, 
have altered political space in Kurdistan. Emphasis on human rights and economic 
development has become central to Kurdish memory dialogue across state boundaries. 
With the help of international governance institutions, Kurdish political discourse “takes 
place in a zone of high global attention paid by the United Nations, NGOs… and rights 
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groups such as Amnesty International.”40 These connections remain asymmetrical across 
state boundaries, with the KRG as the leading global participant. Yet due to the trans-
state reach of communication technology, international discourse has come to influence 
all regions of Kurdistan. 
In the wake of resettlement laws and cultural repression in Turkey during the 
1930s, tribal chiefs sent a letter to the secretary-general of the League of Nations 
describing their struggle for ‘human rights’ in the city of Dersim, later renamed by the 
Turkish Republic to Tunceli.41 Though the plea for assistance brought no relief, the 
Kurdish struggle would find allies in international institutions nearly 70 years later as 
Turkey’s bid for EU accession necessitated the resolution of Kurdish cultural and 
linguistic human rights violations. 42 This influence, coinciding with increased 
international humanitarian and development efforts in Iraq following the Gulf War, has 
given Kurdish nationalists allies outside of state boundaries that shape political 
opportunity and expression.  
British playwright Harold Pinter traveled with Arthur Miller to Turkey in 1985 on 
behalf of International PEN, an organization that advocates for greater freedom in the 
realm of journalism and publishing. Appalled at the state of Kurdish rights in Turkey, 
Pinter began to write the play Mountain Language. Set in an unspecified nation-state 
where a minority ethnic group has had their language banned, Pinter connected the 
struggle of the Irish, Basque, Kurds, and other groups whose language rights were 
violated by oppressive states. Published in 1988, Mountain Language wouldn’t open until 
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1996—during the zenith of the Turkish-PKK civil war. In the plays first scene, capital 
police accost an elderly woman who cannot speak the language of the state.43 
OFFICER: Now hear this. You are mountain people. You hear me? Your language is 
dead. It is forbidden… Do you understand? It is outlawed. You may only 
speak the language of the capital. That is the only language permitted in 
this place. You will be badly punished if you attempt to speak your 
mountain language. This is a military decree. Your language no longer 
exists. Any questions? 
SERGEANT: What language do you speak? What Language do you speak with your  
  arses? 
 London-based Kurdish actors would produce the play in 1996 at the Yeni Yasam 
theater, nearly 3 years after the EU released the Copenhagen Criteria—which defined 
democratization policies for Turkey to administer before accession—and 5 years after 
Turkish President Tugut Özal legalized the private use of Kurdish.44 Organizations like 
the Kurdish Human Rights Association in London (founded in 1992) began to collaborate 
with international human rights monitors, the European Parliament, and other 
international courts, linking the Kurdish “nationalist project to the…human rights agenda 
and its European-backed political institutions.”45 Turkey’s friction with NGOs and 
international advocacy groups would define Kurdish national consciousness through the 
end of the 1990s and 2000s, where marginal openings in publication, broadcasting, and 
individual rights were coupled with mass arrests of Kurdish activists. In the last scene of 
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Pinter’s play, an exchange between a prisoner and capital guards capture the uncertain 
political space where nominal opening is coupled with persecution:46 
GUARD: Oh, I forgot to tell you. They’ve changed the rules. She can speak. She can 
  speak in her own language. Until further notice. 
PRISONER: She can speak? 
GUARD: Yes. Until further notice. New rules. 
PRISONER: Mother, you can speak. (Pause.) Mother, I’m speaking to you. You see? 
We can speak. You can speak to me in our own language. (She is still.) 
Can’t you hear me? Do you hear me? (She does not respond.) Mother? 
SEARGANT: (To Guard.) Look at this. You go out of your way to give them a helping 
hand and they fuck it up. 
(Blackout.) 
 
 
 The tactics of Kurdish Human Rights groups and communication networks with 
Europe would contrast sharply with the violent methods of the PKK in Turkey. The 
atmosphere of civil war was animated by PKK demands for succession and armed 
struggle, but the ongoing internationalization of the Kurdish issue would cause a tectonic 
shift in national consciousness.  
PKK leader Abduallah Öcalan’s arrest in 1999 would signify the end of party 
advocacy for succession, and prioritize the internationalization of the Kurdish issue. 
Though sentenced to death, Öcalan appealed to the European Court of Human Rights (to 
which Turkey belongs) and won a request for Ankara to postpone his execution. He then 
issued an order to the PKK to give up arms and began a months long process of PKK 																																																								
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leaders within Turkey and in Europe surrendering to the Turkish police. M. Hakan Yavuz 
stated, “Öcalan’s arrest robs the PKK of a charismatic yet brutal leader, but allows it to 
refashion itself in a more civilized, democratic, and peaceful manner.”47 PKK de-
escalation, adoption of human rights language, and Kurdish discourse across state lines 
would alter Kurdish narratives in Turkey from succession and armed struggle to 
autonomy and human rights.  
Prior to Öcalan’s arrest, Kurdish national narratives emphasized the belief that, 
“Kurd[s] did not have any choice other than rebellion in the face of an… increasingly 
despotic regime… This assumption served to justify claims for independence through 
armed struggle.”48 Following the events of 1999, Öcalan repeatedly emphasized, 
“maintaining the spirit of 1925,” of Sheikh Said’s rebellion, but for the purpose of 
democracy and Kurdish rights. “According to him, the twenty first century would be one 
of democracy and human rights in which there was no place for violence or rebellion.”49 
Backed by new international allies, Kurdish political narratives adopted human rights 
language in order to gain legitimacy internally and externally. Öcalan’s shift in narrative, 
though violently condemned by some PKK militants, aligned Kurdish political leadership 
with the majority of Kurds who believed succession impossible. In the words of a 
neighborhood organizer in Diyarbakir, “Leader Öcalan and Sheikh Said are the same for 
us; they both fought and suffered for us. The rest is unimportant.”50 
Access to Western media and the solidification of trans-state communication 
networks united Kurdish people across the region in solidarity following the arrest of 
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Öcalan. Television images of Öcalan captured, blindfolded, and handcuffed resonated 
with the Kurds who were more and more influenced by trans-national discourse. Mass 
protests around the world called his capture a defeat, but the new international space for 
Kurdish politics turned “a defeat into an opportunity and a catalyst for further 
politicization and mobilization of the Kurdish masses.”51 Fatma Göcek identified this 
event as the beginning of a new political movement in Turkey that divorces the Kurdish 
issue from violence—and international organizations lie at the center of this change. As 
former Turkish Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz declared, “the road to EU accession passes 
through Diyarbakir.”52  By 2002, The Turkish Republic began adopting constitutional 
reforms aiming to fulfill the Copenhagen criteria, and in 2004 Turkey passed an 
amendment that asserted the primacy “of international human rights law over Turkish 
regulation when the two came into conflict.”53 Despite Turkey’s consistent jailing of 
Kurdish activists and PKK party members, refashioning major collective memories as a 
struggle for democracy rather than a struggle for independence has given the Kurdish 
national movement many more allies, both in the Middle East and abroad. 
These changes in narratives have certainly crossed state borders. In Iran, Kurdish 
political parties—more and more connected to Kurdish political spaces in Iraq, Turkey, 
and Europe—also adopted new language. Rather than secession, political parties founded 
in the 1990s, like the Revolutionaries’ Union of Kurdistan, have outlined platforms 
centered on self-determination and democracy. This organization, as well as the Kurdish 
United Front in Tehran, has proposed democracy as the solution to persistent ethnic 
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conflict in Iran.54 While Iran largely remains unconnected to the international institutions 
that were active in Turkey and Iraq, the changing discourse no doubt entered Iranian 
Kurdish political consciousness through communication technology. Despite insulation, 
even Kurds in Iran have access to these new developments. 
In 2017, Öcalan published War and Peace in Kurdistan: Perspectives on a 
Political Solution to the Kurdish Question. Written from prison, his perspective in the 
book reflects ongoing trends in Kurdish discourse that are explicitly framed within 
international human rights language and a democratic ethos. Though Öcalan has 
abdicated his leadership of the PKK, he nonetheless constitutes a major force in Kurdish 
politics—both abroad and in the Middle East. His critiques of PKK tactics during the 
civil war, namely the initiation of violence outside of self-defense and the hierarchical 
structure of institutional power, focus on recasting the Kurdish issue in opposition to 
demands for a new state. In his new strategic model he outlines various approaches that 
reflect political developments across Kurdistan.  
“We regard this right [of self-determination] as the basis for the establishment of 
grassroots democracies without seeking new political borders… The countries 
that presently exist here need democratic reforms going beyond mere lip-service 
to democracy… Such a model allows a more adequate implementation of basic 
values like freedom and equality than traditional administrative models… 
However, women may also be regarded as an oppressed class or nation… 
Women’s liberation must assume a key strategic role in the democratic struggle 
for freedom in Kuridstan.”55 
 
 He additionally outlines reforms for political parties that must be divorced from 
economic clientelism, the inclusion of minorities within Kurdistan in the political 
process, the need for an independent media, transition away from all forms of tribal 
authority, environmental protection, and the illegalization of female ‘honor killings.’ As 																																																								
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these approaches have become adopted into Kurdish political discourse, international 
governance has largely aided local organization. Kurdish women play a unique role, not 
only in Turkish women’s rights organization, but in the Kurdish national movement. 
“Kurdish women also offer differentiated readings of violence against women, often 
demanding that WROs’ working definition be expanded to include violent experienced 
by Kurdish women who are subject to multiple violations.”56 Not only is the call for 
democracy a radical shift in Kurdish discourse, but also the incorporation of female 
narratives in national discourse exemplifies the influence that international organizations 
have on political mobilization. Kurds, once known for honor killings and female 
repression under tribal authority, are slowly opening up to new values of women’s rights. 
Important organizations include the Kurdish Women’s Rights Watch (KWRK), Kurdish 
Women Against Honor Killing (KWAHK), and Kamer. 
Though Turkish state policy has resisted, and in recent years abandoned, 
democratic opening, Kurdish nationalism in Turkey is indisputably guided by human 
rights and international discourse. Political space in Turkey, with the assistance of NGOs, 
has largely developed Kurdish demands for linguistic and cultural rights. Yet 
opportunities for democratic reform and the rebuilding of war torn regions have remained 
severely limited. On the other side of the Turkish border, Iraqi Kurdistan has had the 
most opportunity to rebuild, in addition to (re) narrating Kurdish nationalism. While 
Kurds in Turkey have become integrated into the human rights agenda, Iraqi Kurds have 
been able to leverage globalization to rebuild. 
Coinciding with political opening in Turkey in 1991, Iraqi Kurds in the wake of 
the Gulf War “have accessed a large transnational space that has encouraged the 																																																								
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economic and political development of Kurdistan.”57 This space has facilitated major 
discourse changes that recast Kurdish nationalism from a primarily ethnic movement, to a 
democratic one. Though the revitalization of Kurdish ethnicity is central to the project of 
the KRG, space has been opened for other identities to coexist under the democratic 
project begun in 1992. By 2005, following the American invasion to overthrow Saddam 
Hussein, the KRG became an internationally legitimized entity that represents nearly 6 
million Kurdish people, as well as many Turks, Persians, and Arabs.58 
At the outset of the 1990s, Iraqi Kurdistan remained a largely rural society. 
American and French supported no-fly zones following the Gulf War allowed for 
international aid programs to administer humanitarian resources in the region and bolster 
the regional economy.  
“INGOs helped pay teacher salaries, implement school feeding programs rebuild 
access roads, reconstruct villages and resettle…nearly 2 million internally 
displaced persons (IDPs)… Kurdish officials developed a strategy of cooperating 
with the INGOs as a means of rehabilitating the region and advancing their 
nationalist project.”59 
 
Lingering outrage over Hussein’s Anfal campaigns and the increasing 
international clout leveraged by Kurdish professionals in Europe resulted in substantial 
global attention to the nascent democracy. The period from 1992-1996 can be 
characterized as a period of dependency, where control of aid resources was in the hands 
of warring PUK and KDP factions. “Where traditional loyalties to local leaders and their 
political parties remained salient, the aid programmme has the unintended consequence 
of encouraging conflict.”60 Yet even after the withdrawal of coalition forces in Iraq after 
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1996, the international community continued to support the Kurds as victims of the 
Hussein regime.  
Following the peace agreement between Talabani (leader of the PUK) and 
Barzani (leader of the KDP) in 1997, aid was eschewed for development projects that 
aimed at funding local entrepreneurs, civil society developments, and manufacturing 
through the oil-for-food program (OFFP). “Indeed, the program was rampant with 
accountability problems… However, it provided Iraqi Kuridstan with about four billion 
dollars worth of humanitarian good and services, further encouraging reconstruction and 
rehabilitation programs in Kurdistan.”61 Many of these projects were aimed at building 
manufacturing plants—of which 100 were built between 1995 and 2000—and training 
civil society as well as local entrepreneurs. The creation of a new professional class in 
Iraqi Kurdistan, much like Kurds in Turkey, devolved political and economic power 
away from traditional leaders and political parties. Additionally, the participation of UN 
officials in training programs for KRG representatives aimed at imparting principles of 
good governance and negotiation. “Kurdish officials that liaised with the UN gained 
professional experience, administrative and language skills, and learned about the 
policies and protocols of international organizations.”62 Though economic dependency of 
the KRG on external sources of food and capital remained, the period from 1992-2003 
marked a period of substantial opening to international political governance and other 
parts of Kurdistan in a way that Iraqi Kurds had not experienced before. “The creation of 
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a protected, autonomous region encouraged the transfer of people, ideas, and resources to 
Iraqi Kurdistan, all of which helped advance the notion of Kurdish self-rule.”63 
International development in Iraqi Kurdistan since 2003 has further promoted 
good governance and liberalization. An oil revenue sharing agreement between the KRG 
and the central Iraqi government in Baghdad has given Iraqi Kurds stable income to 
promote the building of roads and water treatment facilities, breaking with economic 
centralization policies in favor of public and private collaboration on development 
strategies. This tactic, pursued in close contact with foreign governments and 
international organizations, has paved the way for economic liberalization and 
decentralization. In roughly ten years, Iraqi Kurdistan made the transition out of an 
agrarian region into a project of modernization. “Access to international markets, 
democratizing political institutions and government investment initiatives has helped 
increase the standard of living and a create more diversified work force.”64 Employing 
Kurds from all over the Middle East, businesses within the KRG are becoming a major 
factor in opening the labor market to the entire Kurdish community. New entrepreneurial 
Kurdish political elite, largely influenced by international policies and economic 
discourse, “have compromised their nationalist agenda for the Iraqi federalist project.”65 
Kurdish nationalism as a result, is becoming a proxy for demands for modernity 
and freedom. The project of ‘building a nation-state within a nation-state’ in Iraq has 
situated the KRG as a hub for Kurdish culture and freedom. “Iraqi Kurdistan displays a 
kind of globalized modern… that takes place in a zone of high global attention by the 
United Nations, NGOs, nonlocal media, world powers such as the United States and 																																																								
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Europe, major industry, and rights groups such as Amnesty International.”66 Diasporans 
are returning from Europe, setting up social fields and local entrepreneurial projects that 
bring significant capital into the hands of KRG citizens. These changes, though still 
confronting inherited tribal and political loyalties, are pushing the boundaries of Kurdish 
national identity in concert with the human and cultural rights movement in Turkey. 
“Now, girls and women are starting to consider, and a few are starting to practice, 
mobility on occasions other than marriage.”67 Females in the KRG report being able, for 
the first time, to go in sit in public parks alone without fear of sexual harassment.68 
Additionally, once caustically considered national dress for men, Iraqi Kurds no longer 
feel the necessity of carrying rifles with them into public. As Diane King noted, “In this 
respect, the Kurdistan Region is starting to feel much more like the Western countries 
than are in many ways its model.”69   
The KRG has also sought to develop public education programs, increasing 
literacy throughout the region. Subtle developments in Kurdish language through history 
textbooks provide a sterling example of how Kurdish ethno-nationalism, with all its 
victories in the last two decades, is downplaying its own ethnic dimension. KRG 
textbooks frequently refer to the “Kurdish nation” when referring to the victims of 
genocide campaigns or repressive state policies—a term that denotes those who are 
ethnically Kurdish. Yet, “since the establishment of the KRG in 1992, the term 
‘Kurdistani nation’ has emerged as a substitute for ‘Kurdish nation.’”70 Kurdistani, 
though inclusive of ethnic Kurds, denotes anyone holding KRG citizenship. This new 																																																								
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terminology, not itself an outright revolutionary change, signals significant opening of 
Kurdish national identity. Even outside KRG textbooks, “official correspondence and 
speeches,” by Iraqi Kurd leaders, “replaced the term ‘Kurdish people’ with ‘Kurdistani 
people,’ creating a more inclusive notion of citizenship that extends beyond ethnicity.”71 
Considering that only a few years prior assimilated Kurds in Turkey were murdered by 
the PKK, and Kurds in Iraq waged a divisive civil war, de-emphasis on the ethnic 
dimension of Kurdish nationalism is an impressive step toward liberal democracy.  
The blending of diaspora nationalism—which has developed within the political 
culture of European democracies—with various nationalisms maintained by Turkish, 
Syrian, and Iranian Kurds relocated to the KRG has substantially de-ethnicized Kurdish 
nationalism in favor of inclusivity. The focus on human rights has been propelled in Iraqi 
Kurdistan by democratic stability and economic modernization. As Turkey’s political 
opening and the KRG development process occurred simultaneously, changes in political 
discourse across the two states have manifested in the materialization of Kurdish 
memories. In the following section, the forces of technology, globalization, and 
international governance are distilled in various public sites where Kurds have expressed 
their new freedoms through the recovery of memory. These public spaces are animated 
by a dialectic between international human rights discourse and localized trauma, 
signaling strong currents in Kurdish nationalism that largely forgo revanchist claims and 
hold entrenched parties/leaders accountable. 
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Public Memory Spaces: Distilling Globalization and Local Trauma 
Denise Natali wrote in 2005, “Even if Kurdish nationalism is reconstructed on a 
transnational scale, it is less certain as to how transnationalism has affected Kurdayeti in 
different homelands.”72 As the previous section showed, international political discourse 
and the human rights agenda has freely traveled across the Kurdish region of the Middle 
East through communication technology, increased human mobility, and international 
organizations. Though Kurdish identity and national consciousness widely varies 
according to religion, class, party, and state of origin, transnationalism has left a mark on 
the Kurdish community as whole in readily identifiable ways. Greater Kurdish political 
freedom in the late 90s and throughout the 2000s has opened a chasm of memories that 
employ the language of international human rights for the purpose of a trans-state 
national push for democratization. Despite a long-standing agenda of independence, new 
political parties and the broader Kurdish public express preference for democracy, 
individual freedom, and economic development through public sites inhabited by 
traumatic memories. Discourse surrounding such sites varies across state borders, but 
what is common is a fundamental reorientation toward democracy as a solution to the 
Kurdish issue.  
 
Diyarbakir: An Urban Memory Project 
 On the corner of Dagkapi Sqaure, where in 1925 Sheikh Said was hanged and 
surreptitiously buried, a ten-meter high mural of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk peers from a 
white, ten-story Army House. Common myth is that the Turkish Republic installed the 
mural to eternally surveil the Sheikh, keeping a close eye on the legendary Kurdish hero 																																																								
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even in the afterlife. Public spaces of memory dot the political landscape of Diyarbakir, 
the most populated Kurdish urban city in the world. Though memory spaces of Kurdish 
suffering exist throughout the Turkish republic, the old city of Diyarbakir offers insight 
into how Kurdish citizens have empowered themselves through creating public sites 
where Kurdish history can be inhabited, discussed, and transformed on a local level. The 
persistent restrictions of Kurdish expression in Turkey inhibit political parties from 
making lasting democratic reforms at the national stage, but localized efforts to remake 
urban space into symbolically powerful memory sites mobilizes Kurdish political 
consciousness in impressive ways. 
 Beginning in the 1990s, Diyarbakir experienced substantial urbanization, bringing 
over 1.5 million Kurdish citizens into close contact. The disintegration of rural life 
through forced relocation and insurgency warfare from the PKK left most Kurds with 
dead family members, destroyed homes, and an uncertain future. They carried with them, 
along with their belongings, traumatic stories of friends, neighbors, and relatives lost in 
the violence. These stories would form the basis of local movements to rename streets, 
parks, and squares—often with the explicit aim of staging symbolic revolts, rather than 
actual ones, against the Turkish Republic. The collective memory of Sheikh Said, which 
was popularized in this time, would transform the city of Diyarbakir—and Dagkapi 
Square—into an environment of memory.73 Within this city, urban space has been 
transformed by local Kurdish citizens, mayors, and parties who are building Kurdish 
nationalism by building public sites of memory. “Rather than through top-down 
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interventions, this has involved everyday practices of residents that recall a traumatic past 
and imagine a common future.”74 
 In line with EU accession efforts, Kurdish political parties were granted the 
ability to participate in federal elections. Though the PKK was outlawed as a terrorist 
organization, other Kurdish political parties throughout the 1990s and 2000s would play a 
central role in remaking public space for Kurdish national discourse. The first of such 
parties was the People’s Labor Party (HEP), and it gained 22 seats in federal parliament 
in 1991. It subsequently changed its name to the Democracy Party (DEP) and was banned 
in 1993. In its place emerged the People’s Democracy Party (HADEP), until it was 
banned in 2003. Kurdish political parties would materialize in such a manner throughout 
the rest of the 2000s. When one party closed, another opened in its place. These parties, 
particularly in eastern Anatolia, leveraged local mayoral seats to remake urban space as a 
flashpoint for Kurdish national discourse. In Diyarbakir, party structures “have 
established a vast network between different civil-society organizations (i.e. human rights 
organizations and various NGOs)”, and “played a pivotal role in setting the new Kurdish 
nationalist vocabulary.”75 
 Building parks, erecting statues and murals, and renaming squares and other 
public spaces are at the center of these local party movements. Even in the face of arrests 
and other forms of bureaucratic pressure, local Kurdish mayors have continued to rebuild 
Diyarbakir, constituting the “grounds for social uprising, mobilization, and, more 
particularly, the makings of national attachments, as a main site of contestation and 
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meaning-production for Kurdish identity.”76 Dagkapi Square is one of these spaces that 
has been the center of Kurdish memory politics. As one elderly Kurd said in 2013: 
“Whenever you pass through this area, you should button your jackets and show 
your respect. One day this Dagkapi will be named the ‘Sheikh Said Sqaure.’ 
When this happens, come and visit me in my grave to tell me that you did it. This 
is [my] last wish.”77 
 
 On April 15th, 2011, Kurds gathered into the Dagkapi Square for a public prayer 
service. There, party leaders discussed the vision of one day putting murals of their 
historical figures over the murals of Atatürk. As one prayer service attendee remarked, 
“We are planning to install the sculpture of Sheikh Said right in the middle of the square, 
and there is another project for Salahaddin, pride of our nation.”78 Though these efforts 
were prevented by Turkish governors, Dagkapi Square continues to evoke emotional 
response from Kurds who have inhabited a public space that previously represented the 
power of the Turks over Kurdish leaders. With new memories comes new meaning, and 
the space has transformed into a place of Kurdishness and prayer, two direct challenges 
to the Turkish government. Though murals of Atatürk still preside over the square, 
“living memories and stories of the past resiliently struggle to enchant, sanctify and 
reclaim the Sheikh’s grave, the Dagkapi Square and Diyarbakir, into politico-
symbolically meaningful places—places the Turkish state has tried to violently 
disenchant, homogenize, and empty of their cultural, historical, and political referents.”79 
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Figure 5: Kurds stage Civil Friday Prayer over the Sheikh's legendary resting place. 
 In the areas surrounding the square, city streets, parks, and boulevards have been 
renamed to honor famous Kurdish individuals. These efforts memorialize singers, poets, 
and particularly, activists fallen victim to state violence during the civil war. One such 
Kurdish activist is Musa Anter, who was killed by an unidentified gunman in 1992. As an 
author of Kurdish dictionaries, op-eds in international media, and a playwright, Anter’s 
commemoration on a prominent boulevard reclaims public space for the construction of 
national identity.80 Ahmet Arif Boulevard, named after famed Kurdish poet, and Ayse 
San Park, named after renowned Kurdish singer, are some of the many examples of such 
urban transformations.81 
 Public parks have provided the most essential site for Kurdish political discourse. 
Today, there are over 200 public parks in Diyarbakir—80 percent of which were built 
since the beginning of the 1990s, and 43 between 2004 and 2010 alone. “In the everyday 
life of Diyarbakir, urban parks are sites of political debate, where issues of identity, the 
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‘Kurdish question,’ and culture can be negotiated.”82 As these places are only significant 
insofar as people inhabit them, the naming and creation of such sites provides a memory 
reference point where Kurdish citizens can shape narratives and political goals in 
discursive fashion. Kosuyolo Park lies in the middle of a shantytown on the outskirts of 
Diyarbakir where many Kurds were forced to relocate from their rural villages during the 
early 1990s. The park, which was completed in 1999, contains a large stone tablet 
inscribed with the Declaration of Human Rights—erected in 2002. In 2008, another 
monument was installed that memorialized the death of 7 Kurdish children killed just 
outside the park’s vicinity. The monuments title: The Right to Life. It was installed at the 
exact site of the bomb blast, representing “an explicit narrative of death,” and embodying 
“a critical memory that helps to establish a sense of (collective) traumatic history.”83 
 These sites function as venues for political organization and mobility, as well as 
general social interaction. While the parks have traumatic significance, acknowledgment 
of violence and death helps to alleviate anxiety. The park named after Ayse San, a 
dengbej Kurdish singer, was opened in 2008 twelve years after her death. Dengbej in 
Kurdish culture refers to meetings where people can sing about love of the homeland, 
trauma, and aspiration.84 The park signifies the remaking and transformation of a once 
underground phenomenon into a public expression. This project, commenced by the 
Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (BDP), has appeal to Kurds within and outside party 
politics. “The park prominently embraces all visitors with its ‘Kurdish’ environment… In 
fact, the ‘Kurdish culture’ injected into the park… is a critical factor” in bringing together 
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politicized and non-politicized Kurds in the same space.85 Narratives negotiated by locals 
and party affiliates inhabit these parks drawing on various memories—whether national 
Kurdish celebrities or local heroes—and become sites where government protests are 
staged and organized.  
 
Figure 6: Medya Park is a Kurdish space invoking the memory of MED-TV and Medes. 
 Constructing Kurdish nationalism through urban space has been a formative 
feature of political opening in Turkey. These parks have gained cultural significance as 
places of refuge and organization, despite their close relationship with the memory of 
death and oppression. However, just as these spaces can be marked with Kurdish political 
symbolism, street signs and parks can be renamed; and monuments more easily destroyed 
than created. Democratic regression in Turkey under the policies of Erdogan has included 
the conquest of such political spaces. Ahval, a Kurdish democratic media outlet, reports 
that the Turkish government has abolished 93 local Kurdish administrations and begun 
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re-Turkifying street names previously given to Kurdish figures.86 Additionally, Kurdish 
monuments erected to victims of state violence, as well as other local official buildings, 
have been torn down and replaced by clock towers and other neutralized structures.87 
 
Figure 7: Workers remove Kurdish signage on Diyarbakir city hall. 
The Middle East Eye dubs this policy a “memorycide” and reports that over 80 
Kurdish mayors have been jailed since the beginning of 2017.88 Despite this, Kurds still 
view these spaces, and the city in general, as an environment of memory that has given 
Kurds the ability to “bring different segments of the ‘social’ together, and give coherence 
to the Kurdish national movement.”89 Though Turkey is reverting back to old tendencies, 
communication and transportation technology is making it more and more difficult to 
erase the scars of memory. “Given the existence of diaspora communities and easy access 
to communications technology in a globalized world…such repressive efforts on the part 
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of states is unlikely to bear fruit.”90 Kurdish memory, despite repression in Turkey, 
increasingly finds its southern neighbor a helpful ally.  
 
Public Sites of Memory in Iraqi Kurdistan: Catharsis, Conflict, Kitsch 
The democratic space in Iraq has been and continues to be an outlet for Kurdish 
stories that would otherwise remain in oblivion. To begin looking at Kurdish memory in 
Iraq, one has to begin with Zakia Alkan. Alkan was a female Turkish citizen who self-
immolated on the Kurdish New Year celebration of New Roz. Her protest against human 
rights violations in Turkey cemented her legacy in Kurdish memory as a national hero. 
However, her monument lies in Al-Sulaymaniya, an Iraqi town near the Iranian border. 
“This statue of protest would be torn down if resurrected on Turkish soil,” and its 
placement signifies how the Kurdistan region of Iraq has become a hub of broader 
Kurdish nationalism.91 The freedom accompanying the KRGs democratic project has not 
only given Kurds from Turkey, Syria, and Iran a place to materialize their own memories, 
but also a space where Kurds can exchange stories and create social connections.  
 
Figure 8: Statue of Alkan (Left) and the Halabja memmoiral site (Right) featuring museum and statue. 
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 Integrating stories of Kurds from all over the Middle East, Iraqi Kurdistan has 
provided a safe haven for Kurds fleeing Turkish, Iranian, and Syrian political violence. In 
the mid-90s, the stabilization of the KRG allowed for individuals to hold public 
commemoriations for family members killed in the Anfal campaigns and in the civil war 
in Turkey. This form of catharsis recasts the deaths of individuals as a public loss, 
making personal trauma a collective memory. These funerals emphasized group dancing 
and singing, collectivizing the mourning process and making every Kurdish death ‘their 
own.’ “In stark contrast to the helplessness of the experience of torture or severe 
oppression, public commemorations can break through the individual’s traumatized 
alienation,” giving the mourner control and stability in participation with the 
community.92 While many women and children were victims of state oppression, the 
commemorations of male Kurdish soldiers gave primacy to their mother’s right to mourn. 
Echoing the radical act of remembrance by Antigone, “it was often to the role of women 
to publically lament the dead and to engage the community” through songs and dancing 
in order to embrace “a common history that solidified female bonds.” 93 These public 
recognitions of traumatic memory would connect Kurdish women from Iraq, Turkey, 
Syria, and Iran under the banner of communal suffering. Under the monument of Zakia 
Alkan, women began to assert a formative place in Kurdish national consciousness. 
 The traumatic events at Halabja have also been transformed from personal trauma 
to public commemoration. On the suggestion of then Iraqi Federal President Jalal 
Talabani, and under supervision of former KRG Prime Minister Barham Salim, the 
Halabja memorial museum opened in 2003. Currently home to 50,000 Kurds who have 																																																								
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returned under the stability of the KRG, “the town’s major landmark is a stark white 
monument to the dead. Inside is a plaster tableau of lifelike victims frozen as they fell, 
covered in chemical ash and cradling their children for protection.”94 On the inside, the 
names of 5,000 victims are inscribed on the marble rotunda. The International Network 
of Museums for Peace has played an integral role in connecting artists, architects, NGOs, 
and other necessary resources with Iraq to build not only the Halabja museum, but also 
the Directorate of Anfal Museum in 2012. 
 
Figure 9: Proposed plans for the Directorate of Anfal Museum  
 
The Halabja Museum is a poignant collaboration between international 
organizations and local memory politics. While the museum is expressly aimed at 
enshrining the memory of violence as to prevent its repetition, it has also been a place of 
public protest against KRG corruption. In 2006, during reports of widespread misuse of 
international humanitarian funds, locals and student protestors decried the lack of 
development in the region and blamed the PUK and KDP, who largely controlled the 
distribution of humanitarian aid funds. Shane Donovan reported the statement of a 
Halabja protester: “We are demonstrating because the government says we are martyrs, 																																																								
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but does nothing for us. We do not even have streets in Halabja, only laneways of 
mud.”95 These protests were met with violence, and the Independent Post reported 8 
wounded by PUK peshmerga forces.96  
In Turkey, Kurdish political parties that oversaw public memory spaces did so in 
support of democratization and in a position of political and economic exclusion from the 
federal government. In the KRG, however, Iraqi Kurds are utilizing such memory spaces 
against traditional Kurdish parties in order to hold them accountable. Though 
encouraging for the prospect of a responsive public ready to hold power to its word, it 
highlights the persistent difficulties for the KRG in overcoming institutional party control 
over economic resources. Even as international aid to the KRG has stopped, the PUK and 
KDP still maintain substantial influence in the economy. Today, Iraqi Kurdistan’s largest 
development company, the Middle Eastern Consortium for Reconstruction and 
Investment (MECRI), has significant KRG ownership. The protest at Halabja reveals 
how memory spaces can be utilized in different ways in response to political 
circumstance. Leveraging that site to critique the corruption of KRG officials is a shrewd 
use of memory to check state power. 
While memorial museums play a significant role in the KRG memory landscape, 
the Sipan Museum—or Kurdish Textile Museum—represents the integration of kitsch 
and cultural memory in its modern form. Perhaps the most visited museum in Iraqi 
Kurdistan, the Sipan museum displays goat-hair tents, carpets, and clothing—a Kurdish 
tradition over a thousand years old. “Once seen dotted across the landscape of Kurdistan 
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and neighboring areas of the Middle East,”97 Kurdish textile tradition is on display for 
“Western-style dressed” locals who come to experience a bit of their history. Kurdish 
cultural memory, through a modern entrepreneurial ethos, is displayed in innocuous form. 
 
Figure 10: Inside view of Sipan Museum 
 Where Turkey’s memory spaces are largely tied to new political parties 
with goals of democratization and human rights—contextualized within local initiatives 
and discourse—KRG monument building emanates from the top down, and unlike its 
counterparts in Turkey, is not absent elements of irredentism. While mild spaces like the 
Sipan Museum are local initiatives, the KRG authority largely oversees the construction 
of public memory spaces in Iraqi Kurdistan. As Diane King notes: 
“The regional government is very busy building monuments and holding 
commemorations, very much on its own terms. It seeks to communicate to its 
populace and to outside observers that the people of Kurdistan have suffered and 
do not deserve further suffering, and it seeks to promote the heroic deeds of its 
fighters and nation builders.”98 
 
Sites like the Halabja Museum and the Statue of Zakia Alkan exemplify 
empowering narratives that aim to alleviate lingering trauma from years of violence, but 
																																																								
97 King, 2014, pp. 217 
98 King, 2014, pp. 218 
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when creating narratives for future aspirations the KRG is less emphatic on human rights 
or democracy. Underpinning the formation of nascent Kurdish political identity, memory 
spaces can also divide as strongly as they can unite.  
After Federal Iraqi forces fled the region of Kirkuk upon the invasion of ISIS in 
2014, peshmerga forces from the Kurdistan region—under the direction of the KDP and 
PUK—retook control of the territory, which is legally under the administration of the 
Iraqi Federal government. Within months of occupying the region, the KRG created and 
implemented a plan to build the largest military statue in the Middle East. The project, 
which was completed in early 2017, stands 21 meters tall and 14 wide. 
 
Figure 11: Map of Autonomus Region (Left) and Kirkuk Peshmerga statue (Right). 
 Kirkuk is majority Kurdish populated area that experienced substantial forced 
relocation under the Hussein regime. Containing nearly 50% of Iraqi oil reserves, the 
region is both economically important to the Iraqi Federal government, and an 
environment of memory for thousands of Kurdish families. Now populated by a diverse 
citizenry, including Arabs, Turks, Kurds, and Persians, the completion of the statue 
signifies not only a memorial of Kurdish peshmerga fighters, but also an explicit 
territorial claim by the KRG. Where irredentism is mostly absent from Kurdish space in 
Turkey, the use of state power through the KRG in Iraq risks destabilizing democracy in 
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Iraq in favor of territorial claims. In effect, the KRG is beginning to make memory 
official. 
Shortly after the completion of the statue in Kirkuk, the KRG scheduled a 
referendum for independence on September 25th, 2017, which would include the area of 
Kirkuk—still legally under administration of the Iraqi federal government. It resulted in 
an overwhelming ‘Yes’ from inhabitants, but within weeks Federal Iraqi troops wrested 
the region from PUK and KDP control and imposed economic sanctions on the region. 
The effects of sanctions have hit the KRG hard, resulting in public salary cuts and reports 
of widespread patronage at the hand of the KDP and PUK. 
While issues of party patronage, secession, and revanchism are largely absent 
from Kurdish political discourse in Turkey, the KRG’s significant control over 
constructing monuments and public political spaces has been less successful at 
facilitating discussion around democratic solutions to political issues as it has been in 
addressing painful collective memory. The memory space projects of ephemeral parties 
like the BDP in Dayarbakir have integrated the healing powers of public commemoration 
with peaceful and explicitly democratic aspirations. In Iraq, however, Kurdistan has 
largely been able to come to terms with a traumatic past, but the PUK and KDP have yet 
to adjust to the new democratic environment.  
Under the nose of the peshmerga statue in Kirkuk, Kurdish and non-Kurdish 
citizens have experienced memory to be healing, yet potentially divisive in a political 
space increasingly critical of the parties that founded the KRG. Echoing the 2006 protests 
at the Halabja memorial site, persistent reports of KDP and PUK patronage continues to 
strain democracy in Iraq. As a result of the sanctions incurred by the ill-fated referendum, 
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traditional Kurdish parties stand to lose considerable power due to public demonstrations 
against public salary cuts and persistent party patronage networks. Yerepouni Daily News 
in Beruit reported on April 26th, 2018: 
“In Erbil and Dohuk dozens of journalists, activists, civil servants, and other 
government employees such as teachers were arrested and assaulted in a violent 
crackdown by members of security forces affiliated with the ruling Kurdistan 
Democratic Party (KDP). Protesters were met with an overwhelming and violent 
crackdown that saw tanks in streets, five killed and over two hundred injured in 
what was a new and unusual response by Sulaimaniya political elites and security 
forces, which have mostly allowed protests over the past several years, barring 
several instances of violence and intimidation.”99 
 
 Just as monuments can be built to move past conflict and encourage collective 
solidarity, political spaces of memory can often breed conflict. While the KDP declared a 
boycott of the May 2018 national elections in Kirkuk, due to the “occupying Iraqi force,” 
new political parties are sprouting up right next monuments like Zakia Akhan. Whether 
these parties will respond with further confrontation or non-military solutions remains to 
be seen. Whether memory can lead to democracy or foment conflict in Iraq is a story still 
unfolding.  
 
 
																																																								
99 McCaffrey, “Kurdistan Politics at a Crossroads,” Yerepouni Daily News, April 2018, pp.1 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion 
 
The boundaries of the national identity in official nationalism were and are reliant 
on the ability of states to control information, communication, and transportation. The 
forces of globalization and information technology have provided avenues through which 
this control can be subverted and narratives can be challenged. The resulting discourse is 
not solely a venue for the counterclaims of victims, but also a caucus where multiple 
truths can confront one another, and where conflicting perspectives on the past can be 
assimilated into the identity of a person, a people, or a nation. “Information itself has 
boundaries of nationality, religious affiliation, or other separating characteristics that 
segregate communities to create distinct bodies of knowledge, claims of truth, and calls 
to action.”1 These boundaries, in the age of almost instant communication, are extremely 
porous; those communities that are, for whatever reason, segregated or oppressed, no 
longer exist in historical silence, but can more easily export their narratives to a global 
discussion. “The quiet acceptance of conquest and murder in the name of progress…is 
only one aspect of a certain approach to history, in which the past is told from the point 
of view of governments, conquerors, diplomats, leaders.”2 In a sense, the victor no longer 
exclusively tells history.  
Because collective memory is in the process of separation from the levers of state 
power, the coming years will be fraught with contentious interpretations of historical 
events, conflicting narratives of in-groups and out-groups, and enduring mnemonic 																																																								
1 Weber and Jentleson, 2010, p. 48 
2 Zinn, 2017, p. 9 
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battles over the best way to integrate troublesome pasts into a national or global history. 
This process of assimilating disputed histories is particularly acute for post-dictatorial 
regimes, where the legacies of violence, distrust, and fear must either be forgotten, or 
reconciled for progress to ensue.  
For the Kurds, coming to terms with trauma is the central feature of their national 
consciousness. In the last century, the Kurds have integrated linguistically, politically, 
and socially through various forces of modernity that facilitate the creation of collective 
memories. Since 1950, the proliferation of radio, TV, and the Internet has prompted the 
political mobilization of millions of Kurds who now share a common narrative of 
struggle against state violence. In this way, “memory is… a revolutionary force that 
‘brings to the fore the blood of forgotten ancestors’ together with residual, unresolved 
issues from the past. This act of revolutionary remembering is the most passionate 
objection to the suffering and injustice of history.”3 The details of this narrative comprise 
a plaited experience of individuals across four different states and around the world, who 
nonetheless share a distinctive consciousness and a common mission. 
Kurdish memory is a colorful mosaic of songs, stories, and public spaces that 
continue to gain new meanings and uses in the face of unfamiliar challenges. These 
memories, however, would unlikely become collective without the aid of globalized 
technology and international actors. As the Kurds have and continue to experience 
significant persecution within their respective states, mass political mobilization without 
such modern forces would be unthinkable, and Kurdish consciousness is but one example 
of a nation born with the aid of modern technology and mass media. These new modes of 
communication and virtual mobility create a unique situation in which national identity 																																																								
3 Assmann, 2013, p. 321 
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can develop within communities living across state borders, oceans, and continents. 
While national memory tends to local conflict, trauma, and discourse, it is not and cannot 
develop entirely insulted from the rest of the globe.  
International institutions and actors have come to serve as intermediaries between 
states and the people who claim their rights have been violated. The example of the Right 
to Life monument in Turkey, as well as Medya and Ayse San park, show how Kurdish 
political mobilization simultaneously distills local memory and international rights 
discourse. Though the Turkish state has reclaimed such public spaces under the policies 
of Erdogan, cities like Diyarbakir continue to evoke the memory of Sheikh Said, Musa 
Anter, and numerous other Kurdish heroes despite democratic regression. Recalling again 
David Romano’s statement, in an era where information can travel around the globe in 
the blink of an eye, when new forms of national imagining are accessible through TV, 
radio, and the Internet, “such repressive efforts on the part of states is unlikely to bear 
fruit.”4 
While myths like the story of King Salahaddin communicate narratives of peace 
and reconciliation, statues like the pershmerga fighter in Kirkuk signify the danger of 
memory in the hands of entrenched political power. In the small territory of the KRG, 
Kurds have leveraged public memory spaces for the purpose of catharsis, protest, and 
even genial cultural promotion. Many of these sites and stories have offered unique ways 
for Kurds to mobilize toward democracy and modernization. However, as Kurds in Iraq 
continue to experiment with democracy, corruption and territorial claims emanating from 
the PUK and KDP have created crises for Kurdish autonomy. Despite the efforts to de-
ethnicize Kurdish nationalism in textbooks and public written records, the ill-fated 																																																								
4 Romano, 2002, pp. 147 
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referendum in September of 2017, only months of after the peshmerga statue was erected 
in Kirkuk, reveals persistent difficulties for Kurds in Iraq. While Kurdish political parties 
in Turkey operate in estrangement from Ankara, the parties controlling the KRG are 
beginning to experience the temptations that come along with occupying the state. While 
Kurdish memory has been predominantly constructed along narratives of peace, 
democracy, and human rights, Hans Kohn’s warning that the “former oppressed” may 
renege on their goals of democratization is the foremost concern for Kurds living in Iraq. 
The resolution of the Kurdish issue is far from over, and the fate of 25 million 
stateless people will largely be decided asymmetrically in each respective country 
containing a sizable Kurdish population. However, this thesis has highlighted the ways in 
which Kurds in Iraq, Iran, and Turkey have begun to imagine themselves as single 
community of memory. Though the statue in Kirkuk and the memory of Kurdish revolts 
highlight the role of armed resistance, most of the examples of memory provided in this 
work have been of victims, artists, and non-military heroes. Inspirational figures like 
Zakia Alkan provide, in my opinion, the best tactical narrative for resolution to the 
centuries old “Kurdish question.”  
The fate of the Kurds is largely in the hands of a global community of nations 
who desire the enlargement of the democratic community. Though the chances of 
democratization in Turkey, Iran, and Syria are rather bleak, the emergence of the KRG as 
a cultural and political hub of Kurdish nationalism puts immense pressure on the 6 
million Kurds living in Iraq to sustain and export democratic culture throughout the 
region. Kurdish people not only embody a mnemonic community of struggle, but also the 
most readily capable community of consolidating a democracy in the Middle East. While 
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the KRG is plagued by party clientelism and irredentist impulses, perhaps they can learn 
from their fellow Kurds in Turkey that democracy, human rights, and open discourse 
must be at the forefront of national memory. 
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